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Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad’s 1983 announcement of his government’s 
intention to embark on a privatization policy represented a dramatic reversal of preceding 
Malaysian government policy although it was very much consistent with his own personal 
ideological and policy preferences as well as the then new wave of conservative market 
reforms beginning in the West with the election of the Thatcher Government in the United 
Kingdom in 1979 and the Reagan administration in the United States late the following year. 
Privatization has proceeded unevenly since its emergence in the 1980s. Of the 2,100 known 
cases of divestiture in developing countries between 1980 and 1991, over half (around 1,300) 
were in Mexico and Chile alone, leaving a low single digit average for the others (Kikeri, 
Nellis & Shirley, 1992: 7). Hence, the wholesale approach – advocated by the Privatization 
Masterplan (PMP) (Malaysia, 1991a) – was an exception rather than the rule. However, 
privatization has since become more significant elsewhere, especially in the so-called 
transitional or former communist economies. 
The Malaysian Government has identified five different policy objectives for its privatization 
policy, of which contributing to the New Economic Policy (NEP) has arguably been the most 
important. The NEP, first announced in 1970, sought to create the conditions for ‘national 
unity’ by reducing poverty and reducing inter-ethnic disparities, especially between the 
indigenous, mainly ethnic Malay Bumiputras and the mainly ethnic Chinese non-Bumiputras, 
usually referred to in Malaysian discourse as ‘restructuring society’. 
This paper reviews the Malaysian privatization policy as well as what has happened in 
Malaysia in the name of privatization, even though some such developments may not be 
considered as privatization in the strict sense of the term. Particular emphasis is placed on the 
likely distributional consequences of Malaysian privatization. Unfortunately, much of 
Malaysian privatization and economic distribution has been shrouded in secrecy. Also, it 
would not be correct to attribute broad distributional trends to privatization alone as many 
other contemporary factors and developments would also have had distributional 
consequences. Hence, the story that emerges is spotty and only comprehensive in so far as it 
has attempted to review and utilize publicly available materials. 
The first part reviews the evolution of public policy from the colonial period resulting in the 
emergence, growth and privatization of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in Malaysia. This is 
followed by a review of the SOEs in the 1980s, when the privatization policy was first 
announced and then implemented. These two sections serve as background to the subsequent 
review of Malaysia’s experience with privatization. 
This review begins with a critical appraisal of the official rationale for the privatization 
policy. The following section reviews Malaysia’s experience of privatization, or more 
accurately, of what has been done in the name of privatization. More careful examination of 
the efficiency consequences of privatization and its implications for consumer welfare are 
 1
reviewed, with a view to the likely distributional implications. The distributional implications 
of the under-pricing of privatized SOE initial public offers (IPOs) are reviewed next.  
The final part deals with other distributional implications of privatization and other policies 
associated with economic liberalization in Malaysia from the mid-eighties. It begins with a 
review of trends in income and wealth distribution, poverty reduction as well as NEP 
redistribution policy efforts. The consequences of the 1997-8 financial crisis for the 
privatization policy are then reviewed with a view to its distributional implications. A brief 
conclusion closes the paper. 
 
The Growth and Privatization of Malaysian SOEs 
Colonial policy in British Malaya was essentially conservative. The colonial authorities 
recognized the need to develop utilities and other infrastructure so crucial to profit making in 
the colonial economy. Hence, public enterprise or state owned enterprise (SOE) emerged 
during Malaya’s colonial era to provide the public goods and services needed by British 
private enterprise to secure profits from their control of tin mining, plantation agriculture and 
international commerce. 
Faced with a communist-led insurgency and the prospect of a debilitating stalemate or, worse 
still, defeat in its economically most lucrative colony after the Japanese Occupation during 
World War Two, the colonial authorities sought to win ‘hearts and minds’ from the early 
fifties after little success with its original strategy of repression from the late forties. In this 
context of social reform to complement repression, the British colonial authorities established 
new SOEs oriented primarily to rural development efforts to consolidate a Malay yeoman 
peasantry as a bulwark against a Chinese-led rural insurgency with some peripatetic efforts to 
encourage petty Malay business in the face of ubiquitous Chinese dominance of petty trade 
and industry. 
The advent of an elected Malay-dominated post-colonial government saw a deepening of 
such efforts, by the ruling Alliance led by the United Malays National Organization 
(UMNO), mindful of its primarily Malay electoral base. Hence, after independence in August 
1957, rural development efforts intensified, with some proliferation of new rural development 
agencies. The momentum to advance Malay business interests accelerated from the mid-
sixties, especially after the convening of the first Bumiputera Economic Congress in 1965.  
From the early sixties as well, the post-colonial government’s import substituting 
industrialization policy required the establishment of some SOEs to provide industrial 
financing and organize factory sites on industrial estates, but little more, as the conservative 
Alliance government was concerned to ensure that it did not upset British and other foreign 
companies seeking to consolidate their market shares in the growing post-colonial market by 
relocating some plant and machinery, primarily for assembly and packaging, in the former 
colony. 
From the mid-sixties, most Malaysian state governments also began setting up state economic 
development corporations (SEDCs) to enhance the flexibility of the state governments in 
undertaking initiatives of their own, particularly in exploiting their own natural resources and 
trying to ensure some spatial dispersal of new industries. The abolition of municipal elections 
– typically won by opposition parties since their advent in the fifties – from the mid-sixties 
may well have inadvertently pre-empted similar initiatives at the municipal level. 
Making the transition to export-oriented industrialization in the late sixties with the 
exhaustion of import substitution, various federal and state government agencies provided 
much of the necessary infrastructure and other facilities to attract foreign manufacturers to 
relocate in and use Malaysia as their new export platform offering relatively cheap, docile 
and largely un-unionized labor. 
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The May 1969 elections and ensuing race riots and palace coup within the UMNO – and 
hence government – leadership resulted in very significant regime changes, resulting in the 
tremendous expansion of state intervention and the public sector for the next dozen years 
(until Mahathir’s elevation to become Malaysia’s fourth Prime Minister in mid-1981). The 
new national leader, Razak announced a New Economic Policy (NEP) committed to 
achieving national unity by reducing poverty and achieving inter-ethnic economic parity, 
especially between the politically dominant Malays and economically ubiquitous Chinese. 
From 1971, the Malay elite-dominated Malaysian government’s NEP was officially 
committed to reducing poverty and inter-ethnic economic disparities, ostensibly to achieve 
national unity, understood primarily in terms of reduced inter-ethnic resentment. New 
statutory bodies, government corporations, government-owned or controlled publicly listed 
companies as well as government-owned or controlled private companies all became means 
to achieve government objectives, including – but not only – the NEP’s corporate wealth 
redistribution target of increasing indigenous (Bumiputera) ownership share to 30 percent by 
1990 from 2.4 percent in 1970.  
The NEP’s Outline Perspective Plan for 1971-1990 (OPP1) also envisaged the creation of a 
Bumiputera commercial and industrial community (BCIC), while the Fourth Malaysia Plan 
for 1981-1985 expected Bumiputera ‘trust agencies’ to account for 83 percent of Bumiputera 
share capital in 1990, i.e. only 17 percent – or 5.2 percent of total share capital – was to be 
held by Bumiputera individuals. By 1990, however, Bumiputera share capital2 had risen to 
20.3 percent of total share capital, with trust agencies accounting for 6.3 percent and 
individuals for 14.0 percent, i.e. 31 percent and 69 percent of the Bumiputera share 
respectively! 
Existing SOEs were strengthened and new ones created to achieve these goals. Intensified 
rural development efforts continued to be directed mainly at the Malay peasantry. Greatly 
expanded educational efforts, particularly at the tertiary level, rapidly grew to expand and 
consolidate the Malay middle class. Malay employment in the modern sector grew rapidly, 
both in the public and private sectors, though not without some state coercion in the latter 
case. And perhaps most importantly, in terms of what the NEP has come to mean in 
Malaysia, various ‘Bumiputera trust agencies’ rapidly acquired tremendous corporate wealth, 
ostensibly on behalf of the predominantly Malay indigenous (Bumiputera) community.  
The conservative fiscal policies of the early post-colonial era were abandoned in favor of 
growing deficit financing, primarily from domestic sources, mainly the forced savings of the 
Employees Provident Fund (EPF), set up as part of the labor reforms of the early fifties. The 
discovery and extraction of newly discovered petroleum reserves, as international oil prices 
rose from 1973, greatly increased the Malaysian government’s degree of freedom in terms of 
spending, and hence, SOE expansion, which extended to regional and spatial dispersal 
objectives as well. Malaysia’s newfound status as a net petroleum exporter from the mid-
seventies enabled it to continue to increase public spending until the end of the decade 
without any dramatic increase in foreign borrowing.  
By the end of the decade, however, the decline of oil prices and the US-led tightening of 
liquidity induced a new international recession, which the Malaysian Government initially 
hoped to spend its way out of with increased public spending and a public employment 
expansion policy financed with foreign borrowings, mainly from commercial sources. As the 
deep structural nature of the international recession became increasingly apparent, the 
government abruptly abandoned the counter-cyclical expansionary fiscal strategy by 
announcing an austerity campaign soon after improving its electoral position in the April 
1982 general elections. 
Nevertheless, however, the government continued to guarantee heavy foreign borrowings, 
mainly from Japan, to finance new Prime Minister Mahathir’s heavy industrialization 
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strategy, in the form of steel, cement, auto-assembly and motorcycle plants set up through 
SOEs. Thus, Malaysia’s foreign borrowings increased most dramatically in the first half of 
the eighties, after real interest rates increased as inflation dropped in the face of the 
deflationary tendencies associated with tightening international liquidity.  
In 1985, international recession adversely affected Malaysian export earnings from most 
commodities (especially palm oil, rubber, tin) and electronics. And in September that year, 
the major industrial economies agreed to a major international currency realignment, with the 
yen appreciating significantly against the US dollar for a decade until mid-1995. Malaysia’s 
ringgit – which became increasingly tied to the US dollar after independence, and especially 
after the sterling devaluation of 1967 – then depreciated against the US dollar, resulting in a 
virtual doubling of the value of the yen in ringgit terms, with a corresponding increase in the 
yen-denominated foreign borrowings. As a consequence, Malaysia experienced negative 
growth in 1985, for the first time since independence. With the collapse of the oil price in 
early 1986, the Malaysian authorities were under considerable pressure to respond with 
policy changes favored by the Bretton Woods institutions. 
The Malaysian government was among the first in the South to voluntarily climb on the 
privatization bandwagon, enthusiastically endorsed and promoted by the Bretton Woods 
institutions. Less than two years after becoming Prime Minister in mid-1981, Mahathir 
Mohamad announced the Malaysian government’s own commitment to privatization in 1983. 
Unlike the ‘Look East’ policy and the ‘Malaysia Incorporated’ concept – also associated with 
Mahathir’s administration – which faded in significance by the mid-1980s, privatization 
achieved new vigor, especially after the appointment of Daim Zainuddin as Finance Minister 
in mid-1984 and the deepening economic crisis of 1985-86. 
After quietly announcing the suspension of the NEP, the government basically discontinued 
its heavy industrialization program while consolidating and accelerating various economic 
liberalization measures, including several already announced by Mahathir in the early 
eighties, including privatization. In 1985, the Economic Planning Unit of the Prime 
Minister’s Department announced its Guidelines for Privatisation, spelling out the official 
rationale and broad guidelines for Malaysian privatization. Finance Minister Daim, appointed 
by Mahathir in 1984, is sometimes credited with responsibility for implementing these policy 
reversals. It is interesting to reflect on his ability to pursue somewhat unpopular measures – 
including reversal of much of what the NEP had come to stand for – in light of his relative 
insulation from political pressures, having been appointed to this powerful position without 
enjoying a personal political mandate from either the party or the public. 
The subsequent sustained economic boom, led by export-oriented manufacturing, especially 
of industries relocating from Japan, Taiwan and other increasingly expensive economies of 
East Asia, enabled the government to claim credit for it, also giving it the confidence to 
consolidate the economic development program with the expiry of the first Outline 
Perspective Plan (OPP) for 1971-1990 associated with the NEP. In February 1991, Prime 
Minister Mahathir announced his Vision 2020 to achieve developed country status by the 
year 2020, on the basis of a liberal economic program including privatization. In the same 
month, the government issued its Privatization Masterplan, including a Privatization Action 
Plan.  
Not surprisingly, Malaysia’s privatization program was, at least initially, widely perceived as 
the antithesis of the NEP’s expansion of the public sector despite official insistence that the 
program would contribute to NEP objectives, referring mainly to the inter-ethnic 
redistributive efforts. After all, the NEP had come to be perceived increasingly in terms of 
Malay wealth accumulation, with 30 percent of total corporate wealth set as the target for 
1990. The Malay share of corporate wealth seemed to be growing as scheduled – from 2.4 
percent in 1969 – during the first half of the seventies, but seemed to slow down thereafter, 
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especially after 1983, when it reached 18 percent. Perhaps more significantly, whereas the 
Third Malaysia Plan, 1976-1980 had envisaged that the Malay share would be held through 
government established trust agencies, on behalf of the entire community, the privatization 
program has actually accelerated private Malay accumulation, arguably at the expense of the 
community as a whole, and certainly, of its poorer members.  
As suggested earlier, the advent of privatization in Malaysia did not occur in an international 
vacuum and was certainly encouraged by the changed ideological climate of the eighties, 
especially with the advent of governments of the new right in the Anglo-American world. 
While Prime Minister Mahathir was once believed to be hostile to such cultural influences, 
this is less true today, and possibly then as well, as suggested by the secret bilateral military 
treaty he signed – as Prime Minister and also Defense Minister – with the Reagan 
administration in the mid-eighties and his mid-2002 rapprochement with President George 
W. Bush. Interestingly, the market conservative ideology of the new right accorded with 
views he had expressed in the mid-seventies – against the tide of prevailing Malay public 
opinion then. 
 
The SOE Sector Before Privatization 
For an economy usually viewed as being fundamentally laissez faire, Malaysia’s SOE sector 
has been surprisingly large. Indeed, it is among the largest in the world outside some of the 
transitional or previously socialist planned economies, with over 1,100 SOEs extending well 
beyond utilities. Here, SOEs include the entire range of government equity holdings, both 
direct and indirect, whether majority or minority interests. Since Malaysia is a federation, 
SOE equity is held directly by the central or federal government, but also by the state 
governments or the many regional development authorities.3 
 Since enterprises are not analyzed by ownership, there is no comprehensive measure 
of the overall contribution of the public sector – including SOEs – to GDP. All measures are 
thus only approximations, including official statistics on ‘consolidated’ public-sector 
financial performance, where the federal and state governments’ financial positions are 
consolidated with those of 40 to 60 of the larger wholly-owned SOEs.4 Centralized collection 
of detailed financial data on the SOE sector only began in 1985 when the government 
contracted Permodalan Nasional Berhad to provide a financial data collection and monitoring 
system for the SOE sector through the Central Information Collection Unit (CICU). 
 
Size and Structure 
Official estimates suggest that by the late 1980s, as the privatization program began in 
earnest, SOE sector output accounted for around 25 percent of GDP (World Bank, 1989c: 
58). 1987 CICU accounts revealed that almost half the 1,148 enterprises – mostly subsidiaries 
and associated companies of state enterprises – were still in the red, involving a net loss of 
RM1.9 bn. Some 562 companies had losses totaling RM7.5 bn, while another 446 had profits 
of RM5.6 bn, with the remainder inactive or in the process of closing down. Total public 
sector investments in the 1,148 companies came to RM15.3 bn, or about 71 percent of the 
total paid-up capital of RM21.5 bn, with the state holding at least half the equity in 813 of 
these companies (South East Asia Digest, 21 July 1989). 
By the end of March 1990, there were 1,158 SOEs (78 percent of them operational), with 
total paid-up capital of RM23.9 billion (Table 1). Of these companies, 396 (or 34 percent) 
were 100 percent government-owned; a further 429 (37 percent) majority government-
owned; of the remaining 333 (30 percent), the government held minority equity stakes. The 
total government equity share in the SOE sector then accounted for 70.3 percent of the total, 
amounting to RM16.7 billion. 
 
 5
Table 1. State Owned Enterprises by Paid-up Capital 
 
 Number Total Govt Govt Equity as Average 
 of Capital Equity % of Total Capital 
 Companies (RM mil.) (RM mil.) Capital (RM mil.) 
Federal556 18,521 12,738 68.78 33.3 
State 553 5,048 3,829 75.85 9.1 
Regional 49 241 170 70.54 4.9 
TOTAL 1,158 23,810 16,737 70.29 20.6 
 
Source: Adam and Cavendish 1995: Table 1.4. 
 
 Malaysia’s SOEs are broadly spread across all sectors, with finance (12 percent of all 
SOEs), services (27 percent) and manufacturing (28 percent) dominating in terms of number 
of enterprises. A similar picture emerged in terms of capitalization, with finance and 
manufacturing accounting for about 60 percent of total capitalization. The SOE sector has 
been extremely concentrated: the largest 20 SOEs (less than two percent of the total number) 
had a combined capital of RM5.2 billion (5 percent of GDP and almost 22 percent of total 
SOE capitalization) and a combined turnover of RM29 billion (57 percent of the estimated 
total turnover of the sector for 1988) (Adam and Cavendish 1995: Table 1.3). The majority of 
the SOEs are small, however. Excluding the top 20 (whose average capitalization was 
RM260 million), average capitalization was only RM18 million (US$6.7 million at 1988 
prices), and most enterprises operated in relatively competitive markets.  
 
Table 2. Distribution of SOEs by Sector 
Sector FederalState Regional Total 
Agriculture 5 19 3 27 
Construction 8 26 1 35 
Extractive 6 27 1 34 
Finance 100 33 1 134 
Manufacturing 153 155 14 32 
Plantation 22 61 12 95 
Property 44 53 1 98 
Services 162 135 16 313 
Logging 0 25 0 25 
Transport 56 12 0 68 
Others 0 7 0 7 
TOTAL 556 553 49 1,155 
Source: Adam and Cavendish 1995: Table 1.7. 
  
Adam and Cavendish (1995: Table 1.4) showed that SOEs in Malaysia were held almost 
equally between federal and state governments, with only four percent owned by the regional 
development agencies. State SOEs predominated in the primary sectors – agriculture, 
extractive industry, plantation agriculture, and logging – while the transport and finance 
sectors were dominated by federal SOEs; there were a large number of state manufacturing 
and service SOEs, most of which were created to reduce regional income inequalities (Table 
2). The federal government SOEs were much more highly capitalized, but with relatively 
smaller shares of the total capital of SOEs. Federal SOEs tended to be significantly larger 
than those held by state or regional agencies in terms of equity, accounting for 78 percent of 
total equity capital and 79 percent of debt. State and regional SOEs are significantly smaller, 
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and are much less likely to raise capital from sources other than the government (Adam and 
Cavendish 1995: Table 1.5). 
Federal SOEs tended to have correspondingly larger debt than state or regional SOEs. 
Interestingly, the level of debt as a share of total capital in February 1990 did not vary all that 
much, with federal SOEs slightly less dependent on federal government loans and more 
dependent on both private domestic and foreign loans (Table 3). The average debt from all 
sources of federal SOEs was RM61 million, that for state SOEs was RM15 million and for 
regional SOEs, less than RM5 million. The federal SOEs also had, on average, much larger 
exposure in domestic and foreign financial markets (accounting for 51 percent and 27 percent 
of total debt respectively), while the principal debt for state and regional SOEs was from the 
government. The overall SOE debt-equity ratio of 180 percent was significantly higher than 
the average private-sector ratio (estimated to be approximately 100 percent).5 While the 
government can (and does) extend cheap credit to SOEs, it has also been a less demanding 
shareholder in terms of dividend requirements, i.e. it has been associated with ‘soft budget 
constraints’. 
 
Table 3. State Owned Enterprises by Source of Borrowing 
 Number of Govt. Foreign Domestic Total Debt/Total 
 Companies Loans Loans Loans Loans Capital 
Federal556 21.38% 27.54% 51.08% 100.00% 184.89% 
State 553 34.67% 24.28% 41.05% 100.00% 169.53% 
Regional 49 41.35% 11.81% 46.84% 100.00% 98.34% 
TOTAL 1,158 24.13% 26.81% 49.06% 100.00% 180.73% 
Source: Adam and Cavendish 1995: Table 1.6. 
 
Performance  
Aggregate performance figures for the SOE sector have been overwhelmingly determined by 
the performances of PETRONAS and its subsidiaries. Official data from the Ministry of 
Finance6 (Adam and Cavendish 1995: Table 1.8) shows that, despite relatively poor operating 
performance, the SOE sector undertook very high levels of development expenditure. 
However, the generally weak SOE performance was obscured by high profits for 
PETRONAS and its subsidiaries (whose surplus reached 5 percent of GDP in 1982). The 
counter-cyclical fiscal strategy of the early 1980s saw a huge expansion of development 
expenditure from 1981 to 1984, accompanied by a rapid expansion in development 
expenditure by the SOEs – mainly to promote heavy industrialization – which rose from 4.2 
percent of GDP in 1981 to almost 10 percent in 1984 (Jomo 1990). This surge in public-
sector capital expenditure was – for the three years 1981-1983 – consistently in excess of 25 
percent of GDP. 
Table 4 provides a broader picture of the SOE sector’s aggregate financial performance,7 
supporting the picture suggested above of poor operating profits and rapid fixed capital 
formation. They suggest SOE turnover accounted for between 40 to 50 percent of GDP, and a 
considerable rise in overall interest costs. Clearly, the Malaysian SOE sector was a net 
consumer of public resources and, if not for the petroleum sector, the financial burden would 
have been greater. Table 5 shows that approximately 40 to 45 percent of all SOEs were 
unprofitable throughout the 1980s. Of these, almost half (or 25 percent of all SOEs) had 
negative shareholders’ funds8 – which presumably would not be allowed under private 
ownership. 
 
Table 4. SOE Financial Performance (RM million and as percentage of GDP) 
 1980  1981  1982 1983 1984  1985 1986 1987  1988 
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Gross turnover 24,172 22,910  22,868 26,013 32,870  34,468 34,076 42,849 
 51,026 
Operating profit 11,378  9,751  8,764 8,022 10,273 10478 9,133 8,738
 11,277 
Interest charges 536  697  912 1,218 1,673 1,643 2,099 2,820 3,103 
Post-tax profit 7,368  5,285  4,465 3,208 5.096 4,731 3,553 3,217 5,096 
Dividends 440 496 2,082 2,711 2.504 3,001 3,075 3,014 3,608 
Gross fixed capital 0 3,612 4,642 5,784 5,407 2,713 2,233 8,093 1,620 
 formation 
Overall balance 6,928 1,177 (2,259) (5,286) (2,815) (983)  (1,754) (7,890) (132) 
 
External debt 
Debt to govt. (o/s) 3,218 4,917 5,253 5,247 5,247 4,569 4,589 9,590 8,658 
External debt (o/s) 4,483 5,964 7,345 8,672 8,578  10,031 9,744 9,542
 9,669 
Domestic debt (o/s) 2,560 2,904 3,536 3,317 3,698 4,085 4,623 4,397 4,147 
TOTAL DEBT 10,261  13,785  16,135 17,235 17,523  18,685
 18,956 23,529  22,504 
 
SOE Performance as percentage of GDP  
  1980  1981  1982 1983 1984   1985 1986 1987  1988 
Group turnover 45.3 39.8 36.5 37.4 41.3  44.4 47.9 54.5
 56.2 
Operating profit 21.3 16.9 14.0 11.5 12.9  13.5 12.8 11.1
 12.4 
Interest charges 1.0 1.2 1.5 1.8 2.1  2.1 2.9 3.6 3.4 
Post-tax profit 13.8 9.2 7.1 4.6 6.4  6.1 5.0 4.1 5.6 
Dividends 0.8 0.9 3.3 3.9 3.1  3.9 4.3 3.8 4.0 
Gross fixed capital 0.0 6.3 7.4 8.3 6.8  3.5 3.1 10.3 1.8 
 formation 
Overall deficit 13.0 2.0 -3.6 -7.6 -3.5  -1.3 -2.5 -10.0 -0.1 
 
External debt 
Debt to govt. (o/s) 6.0 8.5 8.4 7.5 6.6  5.9 6.4 12.2 9.5 
External debt (o/s) 8.4 10.4 11.7 12.5 10.8  12.9 13.7 12.1
 10.7 
Domestic debt (o/s) 4.8 5.0 5.7 4.8 4.6  5.3 6.5 5.6 4.6 
TOTAL DEBT 19.2 23.9 25.8 24.8 22.0  24.1 26.6 29.9
 24.8 
Source: Adam and Cavendish 1995: Table 1.9 from Permodalan Nasional Berhad Central 
Information Collection Unit. 
 
Table 5. Summary of Profitable and Unprofitable State Owned Enterprises (percentages) 
 1980  1981  1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 
Profitablea  61  60  54 58 58 52 52 53 60 
Unprofitable  39  40  46 42 42 48 50 47 40 
Note:  a  Reporting net operating profit. 
Source: CICU Report, February 1990. 
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Table 6 analyzes the relative performance of the SOEs over time according to general 
performance criteria based on enterprise profitability relative to capitalization. Although it 
does not reflect the relative size of ‘sick’, ‘weak’, ‘satisfactory’ and ‘good’ companies, it 
does indicate the existence of a very large number of unprofitable companies drawing on 
taxpayers’ funds. Even at the height of the public sector boom in the early 1980s, over 40 
percent of all SOEs were either ‘sick’ or ‘weak’. The findings suggest that SOEs were 
allowed to survive when market discipline would have caused closure and reallocation of 
resources to more profitable activities. 
 
Table 6. Relative Performance of State Owned Enterprises, 1980-1988 (percentages) 
 Sicka Weakb Satisfactoryc Goodd 
1980 12.53 26.24 10.88 50.35 
1981 13.19 26.74 9.63 50.44 
1982 15.25 29.15 9.86 45.74 
1983 12.12 30.12 10.04 47.72 
1984 14.02 26.98 11.80 47.20 
1985 16.79 30.20 11.09 41.92 
1986 18.95 29.54 13.31 38.20 
1987 19.23 27.43 13.87 39.47 
1988 16.67 24.15 14.42 44.76 
 
Notes:  a)  Companies with negative shareholders’ funds.  
 b)  Loss making companies with shareholders’ funds <200% of paid-up capital.  
 c)  Shareholders’ funds <100%, but currently profitable.  
 d)  Shareholders’ funds >100% and profitable. 
Source:   Adam and Cavendish 1995: Table 1.11. 
 
 
Clearly, by the early 1980s, the generally lackluster performance of the Malaysian public 
sector, including many SOEs, required a policy response. Various reasons have been 
advanced to explain the generally poor performance of SOEs. In many instances, state-owned 
enterprises had been hampered by unclear or contradictory objectives. Similarly, performance 
criteria had been ambiguous, if existent.  In Malaysia, so-called ‘social’ – i.e. ethnic 
redistributive – objectives were often invoked to marginalize profit, efficiency or other cost-
effective criteria. Coordination problems have also been serious, especially with the different 
levels of government (federal, state, municipal, regional authorities, etc.) as well as inter-
ministry and other intra-governmental rivalries. With the proliferation of such enterprises in 
Malaysia in the 1970s and early 1980s, many were assigned or developed similar, often 
redundant, functions.   
As noted earlier, monitoring and evaluation of SOE performance was virtually non-existent 
until the mid-1980s, and has continued to remain weak and superficial. As the larger 
enterprises developed in size and clout, they often became less answerable to external 
monitoring, let alone supervision. The non-financial public enterprises (NFPEs) – previously 
known as the off-budget agencies (OBAs) – have proved particularly problematic, especially 
as they were not subject to normal federal and state budgetary constraints. And, even when 
SOEs were subject to such constraints, the administrative and political circumstances often 
meant that they were only subject to ‘soft’ budget constraints (Soenarno and Zainal 1985). 
 
PRIVATIZATION: AN OVERVIEW  
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To be sure, Mahathir’s own commitment to private enterprise – rather than SOE – began 
much earlier, reflected in his The Malay Dilemma (1970) and especially his Menghadapi 
Cabaran (1976; published in English translation as The Challenge in the mid-1980s). His 
consistent commitment is all the more remarkable because of his two predecessors’ 
commitment to SOE as the main vehicle for furthering national, and especially ethnic Malay 
business interests. Two years after Mahathir’s first announcement in 1983, the Economic 
Planning Unit (EPU) of the Prime Minister’s Department issued its Guidelines on 
Privatization, which remained the main official document on privatization until early 1991. 
In February 1991, the government published the Privatization Masterplan (PMP) document 
not long after the October 1990 general election, and just before announcing the rest of its 
post-New Economic Policy (NEP) – or post-1990 – economic policy. Hence, the PMP can be 
regarded as one of four major programmatic documents issued in 1991 outlining Malaysian 
economic development policy for the foreseeable future. Claiming success for its 
privatization program thus far, the PMP announced the government’s intention to ‘expand 
and accelerate further the pace of privatization process’ [sic].  
 Generally, privatization has been defined in terms of the transfer of enterprise ownership 
from the public to the private sector. More generally, privatization refers to changing the 
status of a business, service or industry from state, government or public to private ownership 
or control. The term sometimes also refers to the use of private contractors to provide 
services previously provided by the public sector.  Privatization can be strictly defined to 
include only cases of the sale of 100 percent, or at least a majority share of a SOE, or its 
assets, to private shareholders.  Full or complete privatization would therefore mean the 
complete transfer of ownership and control of a government enterprise or asset to the private 
sector. In Malaysia, such privatizations are not the norm, the most prominent cases involving 
the North-South Highway, Kumpulan Fima and Peremba.  
In Malaysia, the term ‘privatization’ is often understood to include cases where less than half 
of the assets or shares of SOEs are sold to private shareholders. In fact, privatization is 
usually understood to also include cases of partial divestiture where less than half of the 
assets or shares of SOEs are sold to private shareholders, with the government retaining 
control through majority ownership.  Before 1992, besides contracting-out, leasing and build-
operate-transfer arrangements, privatization in Malaysia included nine official divestitures by 
the Economic Planning Unit, and nine sales of relatively small enterprises by UPSAK, the 
Unit for Monitoring Government Agencies and Enterprises, charged with reforming ailing 
SOEs. Of the former, there had only been four full divestitures – involving Sports Toto, 
Padang Terap Sugar Limited, the Security Printing Branch of the Government Printers and 
MAS, which was totally divested in early 1994. The other five – Kelang Container Terminal 
(KCT), Airod, Tradewinds, MISC, and Sarawak Cement Manufacturers – only involved 
partial divestiture with the government retaining control, even without majority ownership. 
However, in the case of KCT, a management contract was awarded to the new minority 
partner (see case study later).  
The definition of ‘privatization’ in Malaysia is so broad that it includes cases where private 
enterprises are awarded licenses to participate in activities previously the exclusive preserve 
of the public sector, as in the case of television broadcasting from 1984. Contracting out of 
services, especially by municipal authorities (e.g. involving garbage disposal and parking), 
and private ownership or even contracted leasing of public properties – e.g. enabling the 
imposition of tolls on roads previously built by the Public Works Ministry or the Malaysian 
Highway Authority (Lembaga Lebuhraya Malaysia, or LLM) – are also frequently considered 
to be privatization.  In Malaysia, when a SOE legally formed as a government department or 
statutory authority, is privatized, it necessarily first entails corporatization, or the formation 
of a limited company incorporated under the Companies Act, 1965. On the other hand, the 
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privatization of a SOE that has been constituted as a limited company would merely entail a 
transfer in share ownership from the public to the private sector without any change in the 
legal form of the enterprise.  
While acknowledging poor and inefficient management of many, if not most Malaysian 
SOEs, the key question should be whether such inefficiencies are necessarily characteristic of 
public ownership, and hence cannot be overcome except through privatization. The 
impressive performance of SOEs in neighboring Singapore, which used to be part of 
Malaysia, or of Malaysia’s well-run Petronas underscore this point. Less politicized – and 
perhaps ethnic – criteria for recruitment, appointment, promotion and accountability, as well 
as greater SOE autonomy, transparency and organizational flexibility would probably 
radically improve SOE performance (Mustapha Johan & Shamsulbahriah 1985). If the record 
of Malaysian SOEs has primarily been due to the nature, interests and abilities of those in 
charge, rather than a consequence of public ownership per se, then privatization in itself 
cannot and will not overcome the root problems. Also, while privatization may improve 
enterprise profitability for the private owners concerned, such changes may not necessarily 
benefit the public or consumers.  
Since a significant portion of such activities are public monopolies, privatization will hand 
over such monopoly powers to private interests who are likely to use them to maximize 
profits. The privatization of public services tends to burden the people, especially if charges 
are raised for privatized services. Obviously, private interests are interested only in profitable 
or potentially profitable activities and enterprises. This may mean that the government will be 
left with unprofitable and less profitable activities that, consequently, will worsen overall 
public-sector performance, resulting in the claim of inevitable SOE or public sector 
inefficiency becoming a self-fulfilling prophecy. 
 
Privatization Policy Rationale  
The Malaysian government summed up its five arguments for privatization in its Guidelines 
on Privatization (EPU, 1985).  Firstly, it was supposed to reduce the ‘financial and 
administrative burden of the government’, particularly in undertaking and maintaining 
services and infrastructure. Secondly, it was expected to ‘promote competition, improve 
efficiency and increase productivity’ in the delivery of these services. Thirdly, privatization 
was expected to ‘stimulate private entrepreneurship and investment’, and thus accelerate 
economic growth. Fourthly, it was expected to help reduce ‘the presence and size of the 
public sector, with its monopolistic tendencies and bureaucratic support’. Fifthly, 
privatization was also expected to help achieve NEP objectives, ‘especially as Bumiputera 
entrepreneurship and presence have improved greatly since the early days of the NEP and 
they are therefore capable of taking up their share of the privatized services’. In other words, 
privatization was supposed to accelerate growth, improve efficiency and productivity, trim 
the public sector, reduce the government’s financial and administrative role, and redistribute 
wealth to the Bumiputeras.  
These arguments in favor of privatization have been rebutted on the following grounds, all of 
which have important distributional implications:  
The public sector can be more efficiently run, as has been demonstrated by some other public 
sectors, e.g. in Singapore (Rodan, 1989), Taiwan (Wade, 1990) and South Korea (Amsden, 
1989). Also, privatization is not going to provide a miracle cure for all the problems 
(especially the inefficiencies) associated with the public sector, nor can private enterprise 
guarantee that the public interest is most effectively served by private interests taking over 
public-sector activities. Also, by diverting private-sector capital from productive new ‘green 
field’ investments to buying over public-sector assets, economic growth would be retarded, 
rather than enhanced.  
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Greater public accountability and a more transparent public sector would ensure greater 
efficiency in achieving the public and national interest while limiting public-sector waste and 
borrowing. Legislative reforms since the mid-1980s have actually reduced both public sector 
transparency and accountability though the government appears to have taken some measures 
to increase SOE oversight. 
The government would be able to privatize only profitable or potentially profitable 
enterprises and activities because the private sector would only be interested in these, leaving 
loss-making SOEs in public hands, thus exacerbating the public sector’s fiscal burden.  
Privatization may postpone a fiscal crisis by temporarily reducing fiscal deficits, but it would 
not necessarily resolve the underlying problem because the public-sector would lose income 
from the more profitable public-sector activities, and would be stuck with financing the 
unprofitable ones, which would undermine the potential for cross-subsidization within the 
public sector. 
Privatization tends to adversely affect the interests of the public-sector employees and the 
public, especially poorer consumers, which the public sector is more sensitive to.  
Privatization would give priority to profit maximization at the expense of social welfare and 
the public interest, except on the rare occasions when the former and the latter coincide; 
hence, for example, only profitable new services would be introduced, rather than services 
needed by the people, especially the poor and politically un-influential.  
Privatization exercises in Malaysia may not even pretend to achieve their other alleged 
advantages, and benefits by invoking NEP restructuring considerations, supposedly to 
increase Bumiputera wealth ownership and business opportunities. With increased 
Bumiputera competition, where prior collusion cannot be arranged, it seems that political 
influence and connections have become increasingly decisive.  
Public pressure to ensure equitable distribution of share ownership after privatization may 
inadvertently undermine pressures to improve corporate performance since shareholders 
would then only have small equity stakes, and would therefore be unlikely to incur the high 
costs of monitoring management and corporate performance. With ownership concentrated in 
the hands of state-owned or controlled enterprises in Malaysia, corporate governance and 
accountability are more likely to improve if the government exercised greater oversight as an 
activist owner than by privatization, with its high transaction costs and uncertain 
consequences.  
According to several superficial criteria, privatization in Malaysia made good progress, 
especially in terms of the government’s own declared objectives. In terms of raising 
efficiency and productivity, it is generally agreed that the establishment of TV3 introduced 
some competition into the television broadcasting industry previously dominated by the 
government’s two channels. After the supposed ‘privatization’ of the Kelang Container 
Terminal (KCT) in 1986, average turn-around time per vessel fell from 11.7 to 8.9 hours, 
while throughput rose until the mid-1990s. Since its corporatization in 1987, Telekom 
Malaysia has introduced several new services and improved existing services. The Labuan 
Water Supply Project was said to have been completed ahead of schedule, and at lower cost 
than suggested by the public-sector authorities owing to its privatization (New Straits Times, 
10 August 1989). 
Privatization has been credited with enhancing economic growth (Tan Chwee Huat 1991). 
Resources are said to have been released for corporate expansion through efficiency gains, 
although no evidence of this has been produced. Growth is also said to have been generated 
by allowing private entrepreneurship in sectors previously monopolized by the government. 
While this seems plausible, the examples of build-operate-transfer projects and licensed 
activities are less than convincing since they merely involve the private sector substituting for 
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what the public sector would otherwise have undertaken at lower cost to users, as is clearly 
the case for the North-South Highway, for example (see Jomo et al. 1989). 
The Malaysian government’s claim that privatization contributes to growth is vague and even 
spurious. After announcement of the policy in 1983, Malaysia went through a deep recession 
in 1985-86, before experiencing rapid export-oriented manufacturing-led growth since the 
late 1980s. Although the mid-1980s’ recession was exacerbated by the contractionary 
consequences of public spending cuts, which can be analytically distinguished from 
privatization per se, there is also no clear evidence that privatization in particular has 
significantly contributed to recent economic growth.  
Also, no claim has yet been made that privatization was a necessary and indispensable 
ingredient for the broader economic liberalization measures of the mid-1980s which probably 
induced the foreign investment increase associated with the subsequent boom. On the 
contrary, however, it may be argued that private acquisition of public assets probably 
diverted potential investment funds. While it is now generally agreed that the stock market 
undoubtedly expanded with privatization, this has not been important for corporate financing 
of the more dynamic foreign-dominated manufacturing sector.    
Advocates of privatization in Malaysia also claimed that it would reduce the government’s 
financial and administrative burden. While there undoubtedly are one-off revenues for the 
government from the sale of public assets, it is not self-evident that the retention of such 
assets would not have been in the government’s and the public’s medium- and long-term 
interest for the variety of reasons mentioned above.  
Privatization is also credited with having reduced the government’s financial burden. 
According to the PMP, proceeds from the sale of government equity in privatized companies 
has generated RM1.18 billion, while the government is said to have saved more than RM8.2 
billion in capital expenditure for infra-structural development through privatized B-O-T 
projects, and a further RM7.45 billion of the government’s outstanding debt is said to have 
been transferred to the private sector (New Straits Times, 10 August 1989). With 
privatization, the government also now enjoys revenue from lease payments as well as 
corporate taxes. Moreover, with the availability of private loan financing arrangements from 
capital markets, demands on government finances have also been reduced.  
While these claims are valid, the apparently deliberate under-valuation of government assets 
– ostensibly to encourage and popularize the privatization policy – has greatly reduced the 
one-off revenues accruing from the sale of government assets as well as lease payments. 
There has been considerable evidence of heavy discounting in asset prices for sale or lease to 
the politically influential and to secure public support for the program. Also, while it is 
obliged to retain those less profitable activities and assets of little interest to the profit-
seeking private sector, the sale of the government’s most revenue-generating assets 
contributes to the self-fulfilling prophecy of the poor profitability of public-sector economic 
activities.  
The contraction of the public sector also reduces the scope for government intervention, e.g. 
for equity reasons or in support of development or industrial policies. Many of the major 
privatization exercises have involved tax exemptions as sweeteners. Hence, not surprisingly, 
there is little evidence of significant tax revenue increases attributable to privatization. After 
all, widespread corporate tax evasion is suspected, while corporate tax rates in Malaysia have 
continued to be reduced across the board since the mid-1980s.  
The official view also ignores the important potential for cross-subsidization of socially 
desirable public works and other projects and programs with revenue from profitable ones. 
Privatization of the lucrative North-South Highway, for instance, means that toll revenues 
from it will not be available to subsidize the construction of rural roads and bridges since 
there is no mechanism established for the state to capture the rent from the former to 
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subsidize the latter. If the lucrative Highway had stayed with the Malaysian Highway 
Authority (LLM), such cross-subsidization would have been possible. Instead, LLM and the 
government ended up subsidizing the private owners of the Highway by transferring existing 
built assets from LLM at a huge discount, providing soft loans, tax breaks and, more recently, 
a longer concession period. 
Meanwhile, the private capital market access argument ignores the fact that most non-
financial public enterprises and even government development expenditure have been 
primarily financed by the private capital market, albeit with government-guaranteed loans in 
the former instance and government borrowings in the latter case. On the contrary, the 
government’s desire to ensure the success of its privatization policy (e.g. by discounting asset 
prices) has crowded out productive, but riskier or otherwise less attractive investment options 
in favor of private acquisition of government stock, i.e. for the transfer, rather than the 
creation, of assets.  
There is also considerable concern about the extent of ‘contingent liabilities’ incurred by the 
federal government’s privatization program which has frequently guaranteed minimal 
revenue flows to private operators, e.g. to toll concessionaires. Such guarantees have been 
estimated by World Bank consultants, and are rumored to have involved RM20-30 billion. 
Such arrangements basically guarantee profits to the beneficiaries of privatization at the 
public expense and imply that risk has hardly been privatized with the government’s 
privatization program. 
Privatization has undoubtedly deepened Malaysia’s stock market very considerably. The 
public listing on the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange of the thirteen entities privatized by June 
1992 raised market capitalization by RM201.09 billion, accounting for 28 percent of total 
capitalization and making the KLSE the largest stock market in Southeast Asia and the fourth 
largest in Asia (Malaysian Business, 16 August 1992; Investors Digest, November 1992). As 
of 25 February 1994, the 15 privatizations on the KLSE had involved RM29.89 billion, or 22 
percent of the KLSE’s total market capitalization of RM117.33 billion (New Straits Times, 9 
March 1994).  
However, it is moot whether the consequent deepening and broadening of the stock market 
are desirable in themselves as the development of financial intermediation and instruments 
seems to have had a tendency of divorcing financial transactions from the real economy with 
all its casino-like consequences, which contradict and threaten to undermine the equity 
financing objectives of stock market development. Privatization undoubtedly exerts heavy 
demands on private-sector financial resources to mobilize both debt and equity capital. 
Hence, it has been suggested that, with privatization, capital resources – which might 
otherwise have been invested in expanding productive capacity – have instead been diverted 
into acquiring existing public-sector assets.  
There is considerable evidence that companies in Malaysia seek stock market listing for 
signaling purposes to secure more bank credit on better terms, rather than to raise money 
directly on the stock market. Malaysia was less vulnerable to the 1997 currency crisis 
because of stricter regulatory control on borrowing from abroad and lower foreign debt 
exposure, especially to short term debt, despite its much greater trade openness and 
consequent need for (short-term) trade credit. Three quarters of the US$35 billion estimated 
to have been borrowed from abroad were accounted for by three privatized SOEs, namely 
Malaysia Airlines (MAS), Tenaga Nasional, the power company, and Telekom Malaysia, the 
telecommunications company (Jomo 2001).  
In their detailed study of welfare improvements after partial divestiture, Jones and Fadil 
(1992c) claim efficiency gains of 53 percent in the case of KCT, 22 percent in the case of 
MAS, and 11 percent in the case of Sports Toto. In the case of KCT, the improvements came 
from (internal) management changes resulting in cost-efficiency gains. At MAS, (external) 
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price competition and investment decisions were credited with the improvements. 
Meanwhile, Sports Toto gained market share through improved marketing even before 
complete divestiture.  
While the distribution of welfare consequences necessarily changes as a result of partial 
divestiture, firm behavior need not. Hence, partial divestiture may be merely cosmetic, e.g. to 
give the appearance of privatization without changing firm operational behavior or conduct. 
Advocates of partial divestiture claim, however, that the resulting mixed (public/private) 
enterprises ensure the best of both worlds, e.g. by introducing (private) pressures for greater 
efficiency while ensuring (public) accountability and the public interests. Critics emphasize 
that, in reality, the result is the worst of both worlds, with the private pursuit of profits 
augmented by government privileges (regulation, licensing, credit, etc.).  
Jones and Fadil (1992c) suggest that Malaysian partial divestiture emulates the 1980s’ 
Japanese trend, rather than British privatizations, which tended to involve full divestiture. As 
with Singapore government ownership of mixed enterprises, Japanese partial divestitures of 
telecommunications, the Japan National Railway, and the tobacco monopoly saw government 
control retained. They hint that such mixed enterprise is consistent with an ostensibly East 
Asian mode of intimate government involvement in business affairs, and was in line with 
Prime Minister Mahathir’s ‘Look East’ and ‘Malaysia Incorporated’ policies.  
The key question here is whether the ostensible efficiency and welfare gains from partial 
divestiture could have been achieved without such divestiture. For example, could such gains 
have been achieved through other means of ensuring greater autonomy, flexibility or 
managerial reform, such as through corporatization and commercialization? Jones and Fadil 
(1992c) admit that there is no necessary logical reason why this could not have been the case, 
but argue that this is irrelevant because they would not have been taken. The presence of 
private shareholders may also have given the government the excuse it needed to do what it 
had wanted to do before, anyway.  
However, the welfare gains they claim cannot be attributed to partial divestiture. Also, there 
are policy alternatives to partial divestiture, which have not been seriously considered by the 
authorities concerned. Their most compelling argument for partial divestiture is that the 
presence of private shareholders reduces the probability of reversal of efficiency-enhancing 
SOE reforms, e.g. with a change of government. In the case of the Malaysian International 
Shipping Corporation (MISC), privatization actually only involved partial divestment, with 
majority ownership – and hence, ultimate control – still in the hands of the government, 
which remained the majority shareholder. In 1998, Petronas was ordered to take over MISC, 
which had controversially taken over ownership of a financially distressed smaller shipping 
line from the Prime Minister’s son, who remained as chief executive of the Konsortium 
Perkapalan Bumiputera. 
In most cases involving large SOEs, privatization has actually only involved partial 
divestment, with majority ownership, and hence ultimate control, still in the hands of the 
government, which remains the majority shareholder. Even if the government share should 
decline to less than half, in preparing some enterprises for privatization, e.g. MAS and MISC, 
the government has created a ‘golden share’, allowing it to retain control or at least veto 
powers even with considerably diminished minority ownership.   
In the first phase of MAS privatization by the Malaysian government, in September 1985, a 
substantial minority (48 percent) of the company’s shares was sold, of which the Brunei 
government held around 10 percent (Malaysian Business, 16 January 1994), raising only 
RM180 million from the sale of almost half the national airline. This, in itself, cannot be said 
to have led to any significant change in firm behavior which can be attributed to ownership 
divestment. A substantial amount of MAS stock was held by the central bank, Bank Negara 
Malaysia, giving the public sector – as a whole – continued majority ownership. Apparently, 
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‘the airline held weekly meetings with the government [at least] until [1990], even though it 
was privatized in 1985’ (Far Eastern Economic Review, 20 December 1990). The 
government clearly continued to retain direct control over the company, first as the majority 
shareholder, and then as the single largest shareholder. Before 1993, MAS was in the black 
only because of the sale of some of its aircraft. For the financial year 1992/3, for example, 
although the airline had an operating loss of RM179.6 million, it was able to declare a pre-tax 
profit of RM157.5 million due to revenue from aircraft sales worth RM337.1 million 
(Malaysian Business, 16 January 1994).  
After it became apparent that MAS could show a profit without having to sell any of its assets 
(New Straits Times, 28 February 1994), Malaysian Helicopter Services Berhad (MHS) 
acquired a 32 percent stake in MAS from Bank Negara for RM1.79 billion, or RM8 per MAS 
share, to be paid for ‘through an issue of 112 million new MHS shares of RM1 each at an 
issue price of RM16 a share’ (Malaysian Business, 16 January 1994).  MHS, one-fifth the 
size of MAS in terms of paid-up capital, was controlled by Tajuddin Ramli, a close associate 
of  Economic Adviser to the government, Daim Zainuddin.  
The government retains a 29 percent direct stake in MISC, 75 percent of Telekom Malaysia, 
77 percent of Tenaga Nasional and 8 percent of Edaran Otomobil Nasional (EON), all of 
which still operate as virtual monopolies (New Straits Times, 8 February 1991; Investors 
Digest, November 1992). Such partial divestiture cannot really be considered privatization 
because the government’s power to determine firm behavior is virtually unchanged, though, 
of course, firm behavior may change in response to the presence of minority owners, or of 
more minority owners than was previously the case.  
Although publicly available information does not allow a full assessment, there is 
considerable evidence that management of MAS deteriorated in private hands. A controlling 
share in MAS was finally bought back by the government in late 2000, with the government 
paying almost three times the market price, ostensibly because it was paying the price it sold 
the stock at (RM8 each), even though MAS’s debt and other liabilities had grown and its net 
tangible assets had probably declined in the interim. The price paid to Tajuddin – once a 
protégé of Daim, then Finance Minister and UMNO Treasurer – was also much higher than 
the price paid a month before to the Brunei Sultan, who had bought significant stakes in MAS 
from the mid-1980s. 
Privatization has reduced the size of public sector employment as well. With corporatization 
and privatization, the number of public-sector personnel declined by at least 54,000 with their 
transfer to the private sector, according to the Privatization Masterplan in 1991. It has been 
argued, however, that the problems of public-sector personnel hiring, firing, promotion, and 
training remain, and have possibly been exacerbated with the New Remuneration Scheme 
(Sistem Saraan Baru or SSB), which took effect from early 1992. The singular priority given 
to privatization, it has been argued, has contained and undermined much-needed public-
sector reforms, including those affecting personnel. It is believed that the predominance of 
Malays among public-sector employees, the presence of relatively large unions in the major 
public utilities earmarked for privatization, the sharp decline in public-sector employee 
recruitment since the post-election austerity drive from June 1982, and the virtual public-
sector (real) wage freeze since 1980 and the perceived need to offer carrots to induce workers 
not to resist privatization encouraged the government to ensure employment security for five 
years and better service terms and conditions. 
Hence, though workers often had the option of not joining the corporatized or privatized 
entity, very few actually did so; the vast majority had the option of continuing with the 
government’s scheme of service or accepting the new company’s seemingly more attractive 
scheme, which the majority tended to pick (Kuppusamy 1995). Privatization also served to 
consolidate labor market dualism between a primary labor market in the public sector and 
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large private – including privatized – enterprises, and a secondary market of casualized, 
contract, often more female, immigrant, unskilled and less skilled or credentialed workers 
(Siti Rohani, 1993). While many affected public sector employees may have felt threatened 
by privatization, many other Malaysians – fed up with the waste, inefficiency, and corruption 
usually associated with the public sector – have been indifferent to, if not supportive of the 
policy.  
Many Malaysians have associated the growth of the public sector with increased state 
intervention and growing Malay hegemony under the New Economic Policy (NEP), and have 
seen privatization as a desirable policy change that could reverse these trends, which 
apparently discouraged private investment, and may thus have slowed down growth. Some 
others identify state intervention with socialism and support privatization as a measure to 
expand capitalism. While statist capitalism (Jomo, 1985) is certainly not socialism, 
undermining the public sector, especially public services, through privatization has had 
important adverse welfare implications for the people, especially public sector employees, 
consumers, and the poor.     
The government has had to legislate many changes to existing laws to facilitate privatization. 
The primary concern has been with overcoming legal obstacles to privatization. Little 
attention has gone into ensuring greater competition or public accountability, although many 
of the privatized entities remain virtual monopolies. Since the Malaysian government tacitly 
– and sometimes explicitly – acknowledges that there is not much scope for increasing 
competition with natural monopolies, it promises appropriate regulatory frameworks to 
protect consumer interests, particularly in terms of price, quality and availability of services, 
as well as “commercial freedom” for the privatized monopolies. Often, such regulation is 
inadequate or does not yet exist, and, where it exists, is widely believed to be inadequately 
implemented or enforced.  
Deregulation and other efforts to encourage competition are well behind those of 
privatization. While there has been a great deal of rhetoric about deregulation accompanying 
privatization, such efforts have been quite limited and mainly oriented to inducing private, 
including foreign investments. In many instances, especially with public utilities, the 
government has retained effective control of privatized entities despite some changes in 
ownership. With corporatization and privatization of such utilities and services, the 
government has retained special rights through maintaining a ‘golden share’, which basically 
guarantees control over the privatized enterprise, ostensibly to enable it to exercise veto 
powers over decisions deemed to be of strategic and public significance. Such control 
suggests that there may only be limited loosening of public-sector control through 
privatization. After all, privatization, in itself, involves only the transfer of property rights, 
and in many instances in Malaysia (e.g. the privatization of major public utilities and 
management buy-outs), even management personnel have not been significantly changed 
with privatization.  
Improvements in management generally reflect management initiatives encouraged by 
increased enterprise and administrative autonomy as well as new incentive systems, i.e. 
changes which do not require privatization as a prerequisite, but can also be achieved by 
greater decentralization or devolution of administrative authority – long advocated by trade 
unions (e.g. see Mustapha Johan & Shamsulbahriah, 1987) and others in the public sector. 
Such authority had become increasingly centralized in the early 1980s with official 
acceptance of the Cabinet Committee Report on new salary structures for the public sector, 
chaired by then Deputy Prime Minister Mahathir, and the later centralization of authority 
over the public sector, in the Prime Minister’s Department under Mahathir, especially 
through the strengthening of the Public Services Department (JPA).  
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Also, the so-called non-financial public enterprises (NFPEs) or off-budget agencies (OBAs) 
were less subject to the Treasury’s budgetary discipline, especially after then Finance 
Minister, Tengku Razaleigh Hamzah, challenged Mahathir’s preferred candidate (Musa 
Hitam) for the ruling party’s deputy leadership, and traditionally, the deputy prime 
ministership as well. If competition and enterprise reorganization – rather than mere changes 
in ownership status – are more likely to induce greater enterprise efficiency, then it becomes 
difficult to conclude that economic efficiency has been improved because of privatization in 
Malaysia. Some of the often exaggerated claims of efficiency gains have been brought about 
by greater employee and managerial motivation with new incentive systems and greater 
scope for managerial initiative with administrative autonomy, i.e. enterprise reform.  
Privatization in Malaysia was also supposed to free market forces and encourage competition 
in the economy generally, especially in the sectors concerned. However, the owners and 
managers of privatized entities have a common interest in getting the public sector to 
privatize services, which can be far more important. Not surprisingly, with Malaysia’s 
experience of privatization thus far, there has been widespread concern about and even 
evidence of the existence of formal and informal collusion (e.g. cartel-like agreements, for 
instance in bidding for contracts, suggesting collusion among bidders, as well as some 
politically well-connected companies enjoying special influence and privileged (insider) 
information, and thus consistently able to bid successfully for profitable opportunities from 
privatization.  
While privatization undoubtedly reduces the role of the public sector in the economy, it is not 
clear whether this is supposed to be a desirable end in itself, or merely the means to an end. If 
the former, then the policy is essentially either intended to aggrandize its politically 
influential beneficiaries, or clearly ideologically inspired, or else meant to please 
ideologically motivated governments and powerful international economic agencies (such as 
the World Bank, IMF or Asian Development Bank) the Malaysian government seeks to find 
favor with. There is evidence that all three factors may be relevant in the Malaysian case.  
 Some other adverse consequences of privatization to be considered include: 
increased ‘costs’ to the public of reduced, inferior or costlier services, e.g. the unit charge for 
local telephone calls was increased by 30 percent just before Telekom Malaysia was 
incorporated; 
the implications of two sets of services, i.e. one for those who can afford privatized services 
and the other for those who cannot, and hence have to continue to rely on public services, e.g. 
medical services and education; 
the effects of minimal investments by private contractors concerned with short-term profits as 
in the case of IWK which made few of the investments it had promised to make when it 
proposed sewerage privatization. (However, investments have been more substantial in cases 
of partial divestiture [where government control has been retained] as well as when soft loans 
or other special incentives have been provided.); 
increased costs of living and poorer services and utilities – especially in remote and rural 
areas – due to ‘economic costing’ of services, e.g. telephone, water supply and electricity; 
reduced jobs, overtime work, and real wages for employees of privatized concerns; 
the contractionary consequences of fewer jobs or lower wages, or both. 
  
In terms of the government’s own stated policy objectives, it may have seemed that 
privatization in Malaysia was probably most successful in contributing to the government’s 
NEP objective, particularly Bumiputera wealth acquisition and creation of a Bumiputera 
commercial and industrial community (BCIC). One might even argue that the prioritization 
of this objective undermined achievement of the other stated aims of its privatization policy. 
However, it is unclear how the creation and distribution of substantial economic rents through 
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ethnically biased privatization has been in the national interest, whether this is understood in 
developmental or equity terms. There is now widespread acknowledgement that most of these 
rents have not been effectively deployed through productive investments to significantly 
accelerate industrialization or to consolidate genuine Bumiputera entrepreneurship. 
Instead, much has been wasted on rent-seeking costs associated with political involvement in 
business, while the very source of such rents and the limited abilities of those who controlled 
them contributed to their deployment in real property, construction, finance and other 
investments with a short-term time horizon, thus adversely affecting investment priorities and 
activities generally in an economy seeking to sustain manufacturing-led growth. Privatization 
did not enhance the NEP’s other equity objectives (inter-ethnic parity in occupational and 
employment distribution, and poverty reduction), and may instead have undermined public 
welfare as a result of the strengthening of private monopolistic interests reflecting in higher 
user charges.  
In Malaysia, it is widely recognized that there are strong influences from private interests 
who try to determine what is to be privatized, in what manner and to whom. For example, 
Sapura Holdings commissioned a consultancy report by Arthur D. Little of Boston entitled 
“The Advantages and Feasibility of Privatizing Jabatan Telekom Malaysia” in 1983 for the 
attention of the Malaysian government; it is generally acknowledged that Sapura was initially 
the main beneficiary of the privatization of telecommunications in Malaysia (Kennedy, 
1991).  The circumstances leading to many, if not most subsequent cases of privatization are 
widely believed to be similar and to have contributed to increasing what are politely called 
‘cronyism’, ‘money politics’ and corruption more generally. 
Often, privatization in Malaysia has not even involved the formalities of an open tender 
system, as sanctioned by the official ‘first come first served’ policy – by which the 
government justified awarding privatization opportunities to those who had supposedly first 
proposed the privatization of a government property or activity. Instead, many beneficiaries 
are believed to have been chosen on the basis of political and personal connections. For 
example, in 1986, it was announced that RM1.4 billion worth of water supply projects 
involving 174 schemes had been awarded to Antah Biwater without open tender. Hailed as 
the nation’s first privatized water supply project, it did not involve significantly more than 
awarding all such construction contracts to the private sector – a foreign company and its 
politically well-connected local partner with no previous relevant experience – as the 
government will remain responsible for the operation and maintenance of the schemes. Antah 
Biwater – which was 51 percent owned by the Negeri Sembilan royal family’s Antah 
Holdings Bhd and 49 percent owned by the British water supply and treatment group, 
Biwater Ltd had – for all intents and purposes – secured a turnkey contract with a British 
government financing arrangement sweetener thrown in as part of an aid for trade (ATP) 
project.  Most of the design and engineering work has been handled by Biwater – since Antah 
has no relevant engineering experience – at the expense of Malaysian engineers and 
consultants who have long handled such projects.  
In December 1986, the Malaysian parliament passed amendments to the Official Secrets Act 
(OSA), which extended the definition of official secrets to include, among other things, 
government tender documents (even after completion of the tender exercise) and any other 
documents or material that ministers and public officials may arbitrarily and unilaterally 
deem secret or confidential. The classification of a document or other information as an 
official secret cannot be challenged in any court of law, while the amendments require a 
mandatory minimum one year jail sentence for any OSA offence. Such legislation, 
accompanying the privatization drive, further reduces the already limited scope for 
meaningful governmental transparency and public accountability.  
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In the increasingly authoritarian and centralized Malaysian polity, with public accountability 
and governmental transparency considerably diminished deliberately by those in power, the 
strengthening of private business interests, especially of the politically well connected, 
transformed and increased – rather than eliminated – the opportunities for rent appropriation. 
Ironically, the remaining democratic features of the system in such a context have served to 
sustain competition and rent-seeking behavior, costs and waste. However, this does not 
necessarily mean that further authoritarianism will necessarily reduce such waste. Rather, it 
serves to emphasize that enhanced public accountability, government transparency and other 
democratic safeguards are crucial for reducing rents – which should instead be more 
productively deployed – and, more importantly, rent-seeking behavior in the context of 
privatization.  
Malaysia’s experience thus far suggests that the government revenue-generating, government 
deficit-reducing, private sector control-increasing and capital market-deepening official 
objectives of Malaysian privatization have largely been subordinated to the ostensibly Malay 
wealth-enhancing objective through rent allocation, particularly to the politically well-
connected. In this limited sense, Malaysia’s privatization program is ostensibly more 
explicitly redistributive than most. The privatization policy’s multifarious objectives 
undoubtedly require various trade-offs, but this apparently consistent bias suggests serious 
abuse for the purposes of political patronage and personal wealth aggrandizement at the 
expense of the other objectives of privatization, ostensibly in the national interest. Such 
‘cronyistic’ rent allocations have also been justified as a type of cross-subsidization of the 
beneficiaries who are ostensibly obliged to perform ‘national service’ by undertaking less 
lucrative projects in the national interest including those requiring massive capital 
investments or long gestation periods. One major problem in this connection is the absence of 
any serious financial projections and accounting to justify this claim. 
 
Privatization in Practice 
Public sector inefficiencies and other problems need to be overcome, but privatization in 
Malaysia has primarily enriched the few with strong political connections to secure many 
profitable opportunities, while the public interest has increasingly been sacrificed in favor of 
private business interests. Some of the more well-known instances of such political patronage 
summarized below suggest that the privatization policy has greatly enriched rentiers closely 
connected to the Prime Minister and Finance Minister, often at the public or consumers’ 
expense. There is no evidence that such rent allocations have been effectively deployed for 
developmental purposes, though inter-ethnic redistribution has often been cited in 
justification. 
The issue of the country’s first and only private television broadcasting license in 1983 to 
Sistem Televisyen (Malaysia) Berhad (TV3), whose major shareholders then included the 
Fleet Group, UMNO’s holding company, the UMNO-controlled Utusan newspaper 
publishing group, MIC’s Maika Holdings, Daim Zainuddin himself, and the now bankrupt 
Syed Kechik group. Later, the then Daim-controlled New Straits Times group, previously 
held through Fleet and more recently by the Renong group, took control of the then lucrative 
TV3 from the other main minority shareholders before a management buy-out through the 
Malaysian Resources Corporation Berhad (MRCB) in early 1993 – with not inconsiderable 
help from the Hong Leong group’s Quek Leng Chan – placed both TV3 and the NST group 
firmly in the camp of Finance Minister Anwar Ibrahim, which he effectively deployed to 
become UMNO Deputy President, Deputy Prime Minister, and clearly in line to succeed 
Mahathir as Prime Minister (Gomez, 1990, 1994).  
In 1985, 70 percent of the potentially very lucrative Sports Toto was sold – without any prior 
public announcement of its availability – to the Vincent Tan-controlled B&B Enterprise Sdn 
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Bhd (60 percent) and to Tunku Abdullah’s Melewar Corporation (10 percent) for what is 
widely acknowledged to be a very low price. While Vincent Tan was then reputedly close to 
then newly appointed Finance Minister Daim, Tunku Abdullah is well known to be a very 
close personal friend of Mahathir’s for at least four decades (Gomez, 1990, 1994). Tan later 
bought out Tunku Abdullah’s stake. By greatly increasing its operations through aggressive 
sales efforts, with its problematic social consequences, Sports Toto tripled its previous 
contribution to government but also became far more profitable (Jones et al. 1992b). 
Although its turnover per outlet is much lower than rival gaming operations, Sports Toto is 
believed to have been the most lucrative major asset in Tan’s Berjaya conglomerate. Sports 
Toto’s profitability has been enhanced by its lower tax rates – compared to other legal 
gambling operations, as determined on a discretionary basis by the Finance Minister – as well 
as its modest – if highly publicized – contributions to sports development in Malaysia. 
In September 1988, Big Sweep lottery operations were privatized to Pan Malaysian Sweeps 
Sdn Bhd, controlled by Ananda Krishnan, another close associate of Mahathir (New Straits 
Times, 16 February 1989). The license for the Big Sweep lottery had been issued to the 
Selangor, Perak, and Penang Turf Clubs, which only sold lottery tickets to their members. 
With Pan Malaysia Sweeps taking over, tickets have been sold to the general public since 
February 1989. Big Sweep’s more lucrative prizes adversely affected sales of the government 
Welfare Ministry’s own Social Welfare Lottery, which was subsequently closed down by the 
government, ostensibly in line with its Islamization policy, giving Big Sweep a virtual 
monopoly.  
Also in January 1989, the Totalisator Board of Malaysia, a statutory body which organized 
and regulated horse-racing totalisators since 1961, appointed Ananda Krishnan’s Usaha 
Tegas Sdn Bhd to manage the Numbers Forecast Totalisator Operation (NFO), which had 
been managed by the turf clubs since 1988. The management of the NFO was undertaken by 
Usaha Tegas’ wholly owned subsidiary, Pan Malaysian Pools Sdn Bhd, incorporated in July 
1988. The NFO operated two gaming activities – the ‘3-digit’ operation, which had 
commenced in 1961, and the ‘1+3’ digit operation, introduced by Pan Malaysian Pools in 
September 1989 (Malaysian Business, 16 November 1991) – further enhancing the gambling 
monopoly rents accruing to Ananda Krishnan’s stable.   
In 1987, the RM86 million Jalan Kuching/Jalan Kepong interchange project was contracted 
to a RM2 Bumiputera company, Seri Angkasa Sdn Bhd, which was set up by the family of 
Datuk Lim Ah Tam, and later, 35 percent owned by Sri Alu Sdn Bhd, owned by Wahab 
Zainuddin – a brother of Daim, then the Finance Minister responsible for awarding such 
contracts – and Hassan Abas, who had worked with Daim in Peremba in the early 1980s. The 
entire project was sub-contracted to Mitsui Construction Co. from Japan and financed by a 
series of loans personally guaranteed by Wahab, Mohamed Amir Senawi (a nephew of Daim 
who became a director of Seri Angkasa), and their business associates. This lucrative ‘build-
operate-transfer’ (B-O-T) project enabled the Lim family to execute a reverse take-over of 
Kamunting Corporation, and eventually, the previously MCA-controlled Multi-Purpose 
Holdings, once the second largest company on the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange (KLSE) 
after the government-sponsored Permodalan Nasional Berhad (PNB) (see Jomo et al., 1989; 
Gomez, 1992).  
Also, in 1987, the government awarded the North-South Highway project on a similar B-O-T 
basis to United Engineers (Malaysia) Bhd (UEM), then an ailing public-listed company long 
suspended from trading on the KLSE after an embarrassing construction (piling) scandal in 
Penang in the early 1980s, and with no previous experience in highway construction (Jomo 
ed. 1985). UEM was, by then, majority-owned by an UMNO holding company, Hatibudi, on 
which the UMNO President, Deputy President, Secretary-General and Treasurer sat as 
trustees (Asian Wall Street Journal, 28 January 1988). The Prime Minister himself justified 
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this privatization to an UMNO company on the grounds that the party needed funds to pay off 
the costs of building its massive then new RM360 million party headquarters complex (The 
Star, 29 August 1987).  
After a public outcry, it was revealed, perhaps inadvertently, that UEM had not submitted the 
best offer in terms of cost to the government (in terms of government-subsidized loans, 
government revenue guarantees, duration of the concession period, and government including 
Malaysian Highway Authority assets to be handed over) or to users (in terms of toll rates). 
Due to its inexperience and incapacity, UEM was heavily dependent on its foreign partners – 
Mitsui and Co. (Japan), Taylor Woodrow International Ltd (UK), and Societe Francaise de 
Dragages et de Travaux Publics (France) – for which it paid a heavy price on terms 
undisclosed to the public, besides causing resentment among excluded sections of the 
Malaysian highway engineering community. While UEM succeeded in completing the 
highway project many months ahead of schedule, and could thus begin collecting toll 
revenues much earlier for a longer period of time, it incurred massive cost over-runs, which, 
some analysts suggest, continued to limit UEM’s profitability and contributed to its huge debt 
burden and eventual take-over by the government in late 2001.  
UEM has also been the beneficiary from several other privatized projects, including the 
Ministry of Health’s pharmaceutical stores and services project and the lucrative second link 
to Singapore (see Jomo et al., 1989; Gomez 1990, 1994). In 1985, it was awarded a RM250 
million contract to design the National Sports Complex near Kuala Lumpur (Business Times, 
5 January 1987); UEM later secured the RM400 million contract to build the National Sports 
Complex (New Straits Times, 20 May 1993). In 1987, UEM was also awarded the RM47.5 
million project management consultancy for the expansion of the gas processing plant and the 
export terminal in Terengganu under the Peninsular Gas Utilization (PGU) Phase II project 
(Lim Kit Siang, 1990). In February 1990, UEM secured a contract from the Penang State 
government to reclaim 392 hectares of foreshore land (The Star, 12 February 1990). In 
December 1990, UEM was given the project to construct the first phase of the RM1.671 
billion second causeway between Malaysia and Singapore without any open bidding, 
ostensibly on a ‘first-come, first-served’ basis (New Straits Times, 14 December 1990). In 
1992, the Health Ministry announced that the government had handpicked UEM to privatize 
the government’s medical store, which handled around half a billion ringgit worth of 
pharmaceutical drugs annually (The Star, 10 January 1992).  
In 1993, Indah Water Konsortium Sdn Bhd – set up by a consortium of companies led by 
Vincent Tan’s main listed vehicle, Berjaya Group Bhd, which has a controlling 20 percent 
stake – was awarded, without any tender process, the RM6 billion national sewage-disposal 
project (The Star, 18 May 1993). Berjaya and Indah were said to be ‘fronting’ for Northwest 
Water (M) Sdn Bhd, a subsidiary of the privatized British utilities company. The contract 
involves the privatization of ‘143 local water authorities throughout Malaysia to manage, 
operate and maintain the urban sewerage systems for 28 years’ (Malaysian Business, 16 
December 1993). ‘Complaints of favoritism are underscored by Berjaya’s relative lack of 
experience in public works. Although Berjaya is involved in small road-building projects in 
Malaysia, it has never built anything the size of the national sewerage project’ (Far Eastern 
Economic Review, 1 April 1993). 
Shortly before the general elections in October 1990, it was suddenly announced that Food 
Industries of Malaysia Bhd (FIMA) and Peremba Bhd were being privatized through 
management buy-outs. The former went to Mohd. Razali Mohd. Rahman and Hassan Abas, 
both close associates of then Finance Minister Daim, while the latter went to Tan Sri Basir 
Ismail, reputedly very close to Mahathir, and previously appointed to various powerful and 
prestigious positions including Chairman of Petronas and Bank Bumiputra (Gomez 1991a).  
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In early 1994, the government announced the privatization of the RM15 billion Bakun 
hydroelectric dam project in Sarawak, which had previously been cancelled by the 
government in the late 1980s after protests by environmentalists and others doubting the 
technical and economic feasibility of the project. The contract was awarded, without tender, 
to Ekran Bhd, controlled by timber and construction tycoon, Ting Pek Khiing, a close 
associate of Prime Minister Mahathir, government Economic Adviser Daim and Sarawak 
Chief Minister Taib Mahmud (Asian Wall Street Journal, 2 February 1994). Other notable 
shareholders of Ekran include Robert Tan, a close associate of Daim, and Shuaib Lazim, 
closely associated with the Prime Minister – who had received and botched a privatized 
contract to develop a commercial center under Kuala Lumpur’s Merdeka Square.  
After the regional currency crisis began in mid-1997, then Finance Minister Anwar Ibrahim 
announced the cutting back of various ‘mega-projects’ late that year, including the Bakun 
Dam project. Prime Minister Mahathir intervened to ensure that the contractors were 
handsomely and speedily compensated for work done. After sacking and jailing Anwar in 
September 1998, and winning the late 1999 general election, Prime Minister Mahathir 
revived the Bakun project again, although there have been serious doubts about the new 
dam’s likely actual power generating capacity as well as the feasibility of the controversial 
proposed submarine cable transmission connection with Peninsular Malaysia. It is widely 
rumored that successive chief executives of the government controlled corporatized national 
power company Tenaga Nasional have been replaced for dissenting over the Bakun dam 
project. 
 
Consumer Welfare and Efficiency Gains 
Privatization is supposed to enhance enterprise efficiency. There are two relevant aspects of 
efficiency to be considered here, namely productive and allocative efficiency. Productive 
efficiency is attained when a firm’s output is produced at minimum resource cost. Allocative 
efficiency is achieved when the consumer’s marginal valuation of the product equals the 
marginal cost of production, assuming no externalities. (However, this does not imply 
allocative efficiency in terms of satisfying consumer preferences for quality services.) To 
achieve both productive and allocative efficiency privatized enterprises generally need to be 
exposed to greater competition, liberalization, marketization, and deregulation, 
notwithstanding scale economies and other ‘extenuating’ circumstances. 
In so far as allocative efficiency may be best achieved through greater competition and 
deregulation – which have not been important in the Malaysian privatization experience thus 
far – it is doubtful that consumer welfare has been significantly enhanced through 
privatization. In fact, there is considerable evidence to the contrary with increases in 
consumer charges for utilities and services in anticipation of, or soon after, privatization, as 
shown in Table 7. 
The government has been preoccupied with getting privatization off the ground. It has sought 
to ensure public acceptance for the policy by selecting profitable or potentially profitable 
entities for privatization and by share under-pricing. It had also minimized employee 
opposition by providing job security and improved terms and conditions of service 
(especially incomes). The authorities have ensured that the politically well connected have 
secured control of the privatized entities. In pursuing these other goals, efficiency and 
consumer welfare concern have been compromised. Efficiency here is understood broadly to 
involve gains to consumers, employees, (private) buyers, (government) sellers and 
competitors. 
 
Table 7. Recent Consumer Charge Increases Associated with Privatization  
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Utility/Service Old  New Year Increases 
 
Telephone unit charge (sen) 10 13 1987 30%  
Toll (sen per km) 5 7.5 1993 50% 
 
Source: Goh and Jomo 1995: Table 7.1. 
 
Given the privatization process, the motivations for the privatization policy, and the nature of 
the privatized entities in Malaysia, competition for most of the entities privatized has been 
limited, implying the transformation of public monopolies into privatized monopolies. In all 
cases, user costs have not been lowered, and in most cases, consumer prices have been 
significantly increased, ostensibly to reflect the better services provided. This is hardly 
suggestive of greater efficiency, though it has certainly ensured greater profitability 
 
Kelang Container Terminal  
In Malaysia, the case of the Kelang Container Terminal (KCT) has been much celebrated as 
proof of the success of the country’s privatization policy. This is no accident as KCT was 
carefully chosen as the pioneering entity for privatization to ensure success and acceptance 
for the policy besides profits for the shareholders. There have been several studies of KCT’s 
privatization – Nankani (1988), Leeds (1989), Ismail (1991), Adam and Cavendish (1995) 
and Jones and Fadil (1992a) – all claiming to find significant efficiency and welfare gains in 
that case. Of these studies, Jones and Fadil have analyzed KCT’s performance before and 
after divestiture more carefully than the other researchers. A critical review of their findings 
provides a better idea of the actual gains from that privatization. 
 
Divestiture 
The Kelang Port Authority (KPA), a government statutory body, previously had the financial 
autonomy to manage the entire port facility, including the container terminal. With this 
financial autonomy, it was expected to raise funds for its investments and to pay corporate 
taxes. Financially, KPA had never been in the ‘red’, and soon after its container terminal 
went into operation, into became the primary source of earnings for the KPA. 
According to Noorul Ainur (2001: Table 4-8), from 1980 until 1985, i.e. prior to the 
privatization of the Kelang Container Terminal in 1986, Kelang Port Authority made profits 
and did not suffer losses from its operations. However, profits were declining during this 
period, for example, by 5.8 percent in 1981 from the previous year, by 16.2 percent in 1982, 
before an increase of 23 percent in 1983, and renewed decline by 0.03 percent in 1984 and by 
21.7 percent in 1985 (Noorul Ainur 2001: 172). Table 8 shows that while the Kelang 
Container Terminal made pre-tax profits from 1986 to 1999, its profits did not steadily 
increase, but actually declined sharply after the regional currency crisis in 1997. 
The container terminal was a good candidate to become Malaysia’s first privatized project as 
it met a number of criteria. The authorities apparently felt that the first privatization project 
had to be successful to secure public support for the policy. Therefore, it was important to 
choose an entity that was not politically sensitive. Noorul Ainur (2001: 5) categorizes the 
container port terminal as a hard service because it involves limited human interaction or 
involvement in service delivery and did not impact heavily on vulnerable groups, with 
privatization unlikely to cause drastic changes. Also, the enterprise to be privatized needed to 
have a track record of profitability (Leeds, 1989: 746) 
 
Table 8. Kelang Container Terminal Profits and Losses, 1986-1999 




























1986a   58,062 - 37,868 - 15,194 - 
1987 75,185 41.7 49,599 31.0 25,586 68.4 
1988 91,089 21.2 54,718 10.3 36,371 42.2 
1989 107,756 18.3 69,135 26.3 38,621 6.2 
1990 127,221 18.1 89,070 28.8 38,151 -1.2 
1991 151,370 19.0 110,099 23.6 41,271 8.2 
1992 160,839 6.3 112,361 2.1 48,478 17.5 
1993 171,640 6.7 127,079 13.1 44,561 -8.1 
1994 181,551 5.8 133,783 5.3 47,768 7.2 
1995 189,272 4.3 116,442 -13.0 72,830 52.5 
1996 191,897 1.4 118,596 1.8 73,301 0.6 
1997 189,071 -1.5 125,816 6.1 63,255 -13.7 
1998 142,700 -24.6 112,465 -10.6 30,235 -52.2 
1999b 118,441 -17 91,488 -18.7 26,953 -10.9 
Total 1,951,094 - 1,348,519 - 602,575 - 
 
Notes:  a Covering period from March 17 1986 to December 31 1986. 
b up to September. 
Source:  Noorul Ainur 2001: Table 4-9. Computed from data provided by the Finance 
Division, Kelang Container Terminal (1999). 
 
Jones and Fadil (1992) commented that the privatization of Port Kelang was akin to selling a 
goldmine. They considered the choice of KCT as ‘playing it safe’ to ensure the success of the 
first privatization exercise by privatizing a successful entity. Consequently, there was no 
unfavorable publicity after the privatization of KCT. Should a less successful or failed entity 
have been privatized first and if problems were to have subsequently arisen, adverse publicity 
could have derailed the entire policy.  To avoid such untoward criticisms, the government’s 
safe privatization of KCT was deemed necessary for the privatization policy and program 
(Noorul Ainur 2001: 205). 
The KPA container terminal satisfied the above criteria, but was functioning at a low level of 
efficiency by international standards. Pilferage was disturbingly high and terminal security 
lax. The below-par performance of the container terminal was believed to be the result of too 
many bureaucratic controls. It was felt that if it had the freedom and flexibility to manage and 
operate its facilities on a more commercial basis, performance would undoubtedly improve 
In October 1985, KPA incorporated Kelang Container Terminal as its wholly owned 
subsidiary. KCT was awarded a 21-year license to operate the KPA container terminal. In 
March 1986, KPA sold 51 percent of KCT to Konnas Terminal Kelang Sdn Bhd (KTK), 
retaining the remaining 49 percent. KTK is a joint venture between Malaysian and foreign 
interests, with Kontena Nasional (KN) owning 80 percent and P & O Australia Limited 
(POAL) holding the remaining 20 percent of KTK (see Adam and Cavendish 1995). For the 
KCT, besides the RM111 million sale of business and movable assets (Table 9), the 
government also received RM16.9 million as annual lease payments to be increased by 10 
percent every three years. Most importantly, KCT autonomy involved handing management 




 Table 9. Port Kelang Privatization: Payments Received by the Government  




1986 Kelang Container Terminal Sale, Lease of assets 21 years RM111 million 
1992 Kelang Port Management Sale, Lease of assets 21 years RM361 million 
1994 Kelang Multi Terminal Sale, Lease of assets 33 years RM110 million 
   TOTAL RM582 million 
Source: Noorul Ainur 2001: Table 4-1; Data provided by Finance Division, Kelang 
Port Authority, 1999. 
 
Welfare Gains 
Jones and Fadil (1992a: Table 13.17) also offer an analysis of the welfare impact of the KCT 
privatization, which is summarized in Table 10. According to Table 10, summarizing the 
distribution of welfare gains from the KCT privatization, buyers enjoyed a positive welfare 
impact. They had paid RM57 million for an income stream worth RM193 million, thus 
obtaining a net gain of RM136 million. Of this, domestic shareholders enjoyed a net gain of 
RM109 million, with RM27 million going to the foreign shareholders 
Who were the shareholders? Ninety percent of the KPA shares were still in the hands of the 
government (see Adam and Cavendish 1995) P & O Australia, the foreign buyer, has the 
remaining 10 percent of KCT shares, through its 20 percent share in KTK, which has a 51 
percent share in KCT. P & O’s management of the KCT is widely credited for the welfare 
gains. If this is truly the case, the welfare gains could presumably have been achieved without 
divestiture, e.g. by awarding a management contract. It is not self-evident that divestiture was 
necessary for the change in management. It is also not clear that P & O offered the most 
competitive management contract available since there never was any competitive (e.g. 
tender) process involved in determining the new managers of KCT. Such a competitive 
process may well have resulted in a Malaysian firm securing the management contract, thus 
reducing payment outflows for securing improved management. If necessary, foreign 
expertise could be secured by hiring foreign consultants as and when needed, instead of 
allowing foreign management control. 
 
Performance 
KCT’s performance after privatization was initially quite impressive after a slight decline 
during 1986, the year of the KCT’s ostensible privatization. As Noorul Ainur (2001: Table 4-
20) and Table 11 show, the terminal had handled more ships and container cargo in 1985 
prior to privatization than in 1986 owing to the 1985-86 economic downturn. Ships and cargo 
picked up rapidly with the economy thereafter, though the rate of expansion declined from 
the mid-1990s, initially with the establishment of Kelang Port Management from 1992. From 
244,120 TEUs in 1985, containers handled by KCT rose to 273,335 TEUs in 1987 and 
603,257 TEUs in 1991, before growing more slowly during the mid-1990s, and then 
experiencing a sharp downturn in 1998 and 1999, also experienced to varying degrees by the 
other container port companies at Port Kelang. Besides the impact of the regional crisis of 
1997, another reason for the sharp decline in the late 1990s was the opening of the Kelang 
Multi Terminal in 1994, which soon developed more attractive facilities than KCT (Noorul 
Ainur 2001: 200). The average turnaround time also improved from 13.4 hours in 1985 to 
11.3 hours in 1987, while the average length of time that each container remained on the dock 
declined from 8 to 3.8 days within the first two years after the management change associated 
with the KCT’s ‘privatization’ in 1986.  
 
Table 10. Kelang Container Terminal Distributional Impact Statement 
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 (RM million, 1985 present values)  
 
 Operated by Gains 
   from 
 Private Public Privatization 
 
Domestic  
Consumers 1,539 1481 58  
Government 1,887 1530 357 
 Taxes 1,650 967 683 
 Net Quasi-Rents 185 563 -378 
 Share Sales (less transaction costs) 52 0 52 
 Debt Subsidy/Take-over 0 0 0 
 Others 0 0 0  
Shareholders 109 0 109 
 Diversified 0 0 0 
 Concentrated 109 0 109 
 Employees 0 0 0  
Miscellaneous 284 330 -47 
 Employees (as inputs) 66 0 66 
 Competitors 217 330 -113 
 Providers 0 0 0 
 Citizens 0 0 0  
 
Domestic Total 3818 3341 477 
 
Foreign  
Consumers 770 740 29 
 + Shareholders 27 0 27 
 + Competitors 54 83 -28 
 + Others 0 0 0  
 
Foreign Total 851 823 28 
 
World Total 4669 4164 505  
 
Source: Jones and Fadil (1992a).  
 
Since fixed assets were stable from 1982 to 1987, the improved performance can be 
attributed to labor productivity and managerial innovations. Also, the costs of energy, 
working capital, and rentals did not experience any significant changes in the same period. 
The only major change was apparently due to wage increases as average workers’ 
compensation rose at an average compound rate of 12 percent after privatization. This may be 
due to overtime payments and increased incentive payments, which may have contributed to 
considerably greater increases in labor productivity. Although it was claimed that there has 
been no change in service charges, ‘free’ storage time was decreased from seven to five days 
in late 1986. This has effectively meant a 28.6 percent increase in storage costs to customers, 
which in turn contributed to a 3.9 percent increase in overall costs to them from 1986 to 
1989. Clearly, the increase in turnover (output growth) has been the main source of improved 
profitability for KCT. 
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       Table 11. Kelang Container Terminal: Number of TEUs Handled, 1985-1999 
Year Number of TEUs handled Change in TEUs handled 
from preceding year (%) 
1985a 244,120 – 
1986a 241,186 -1.2 
1987 273,335 13.3 
1988 319,557 16.9 
1989 393,954 23.3 
1990 494,978 25.6 
1991 603,257 21.9 
1992 672,642 11.5 
1993 759,251 12.9 
1994 804,455 6.0 
1995 863,870 7.4 
1996 946,788 9.6 
1997 992,995 4.9 
1998 788,703 -20.6 
1999b 671,952 -14.8 
Notes:  a  KCT was privatized on 17 March 1986. Earlier data refer to the KPA business 
operations taken over by KCT. 
    b  up to September 
Source: Noorul Ainur 2001: Table 4-23; computed from data provided by Kelang Container 
Terminal (1999). 
 
Since output growth has been the main source of improved profitability, could output growth 
be due to privatization per se or to exogenous demand shifts? To assess whether output 
growth was a result of increased demand, Jones and Fadil (1992a: Fig. 13.7) compared real 
GDP and KCT output indices. From 1983 to 1986, output growth seemed to grow with real 
GDP, but after divestiture, it grew faster. They then concluded that since output growth after 
divestiture exceeded real GDP growth, the difference could be attributed to efficiency gains 
from privatization. However, the export-led nature of the economic recovery of the late 1980s 
has involved proportionately greater increases in imports and exports compared to GDP 
growth, which the authors did not take into consideration.  
Throughput has been on the increase since 1987, and from 1989 to 1991, it registered more 
than 20 percent growth in each year (see Table 11). However, it is misleading to attribute this 
increase to improved efficiency due to privatization per se since many other changes were 
also taking place at the same time, most importantly the changes in management, 
organization and worker incentives. After the 1985-1986 recession, the Malaysian economy 
picked up tremendously from late 1986, with export-led industrialization using imported 
components and equipment. Exports and imports continued to grow rapidly in the late 1980s 
and early 1990s. From 1987 to 1990, annual growth of exports as well as imports was in 
excess of 20 percent (see Table 11). Thus, KCT’s increased turnover was probably also due 
to the growth in international trade during the late 1980s and early 1990s. KCT’s 
performance probably also improved with its upgrading of facilities and infrastructure at its 
North Port base with heavy capital investment in new equipment. The new management also 
reduced the bureaucratic red tape, thus enhancing the attraction of the port facilities (Noorul 




According to Jones and Fadil (1992), the government enjoyed the bulk of the positive welfare 
impact from the KCT privatization. Although it gave up a profit stream of RM378 million, it 
received RM52 million from share sales (less transaction costs) and substantial tax gains of 
RM683 million inclusive of the rental payment plus a variable payment based on throughput. 
This impressive positive welfare impact was primarily a result of increased tax revenue from 
higher profitability after privatization 
However, the authors beg the question of how much more benefits could have been obtained 
if the KCT was still fully KPA-owned with the changed management. Prior to the KCT 
privatization, KPA had never been in the ‘red’. Although its performance was considered 
inefficient, the container terminal – the most lucrative KPA operation – was contributing a 
positive net cash flow. It is quite possible that if the KPA had been given the freedom and 
flexibility to operate the terminal on a commercial basis, the government may have benefited 
just as much, or even more than by allowing P & O to take a share in KCT and to take over 
KCT’s management.  
Unfortunately, such counterfactual analysis is not possible, especially since the relevant 
information is not available and cannot be meaningfully inferred. However, other studies of 
KCT’s privatization suggest that efficiency and productivity gains and improvements in 
performance have primarily been the result of managerial and organizational reforms by the 
new private management team, rather than due to the ownership change per se. After all, 
there is not much change in ownership as KCT remains 88.7 percent owned by government-
owned enterprises. 
As noted earlier, there has been a distinct tendency for the government to sell their ‘most 
lucrative enterprises’ first in order to create a positive public impression of privatization. 
Economically, however, this policy undermines the potential gains from privatization for the 
government. If the ‘worst-run enterprises’ – presumably, therefore, in greatest need of 




According to Jones and Fadil, employees also gained from higher wages by an estimated 
RM66 million. This is in line with the government’s assurance that employees would be 
rewarded for greater productivity, with terms and conditions not worse than those they were 
enjoying while serving the government. But were there real gains? Although wages 
increased, real welfare gains may have increased by less than the full amount of the wage 
increase. Workers may have to work harder, for longer hours. Also, future compensation and 
promotion prospects are supposed to be directly linked to work performance, rather than 
seniority. In the privatized KCT, lifetime job security is no longer guaranteed. Instead, the 
government only required the KCT to guarantee that, ‘no employee would be fired or 
retrenched for a period of five years’. Hence, the immediate welfare gains are primarily of a 
short-term nature, with some non-monetary long-term losses not adequately reflected in 
typical welfare analysis. It is also expected that the union may lose its ability and influence to 
negotiate better terms and conditions for its members in dealing with a completely profit-
oriented private sector employer, instead of a public-sector employer, which also does not 
seem to figure in Jones and Fadil’s welfare accounting. 
 
Consumers  
According to Jones and Fadil (1992), consumers gained from improved services by about 
RM88 million. There has been significant progress in terms of reduction of turnaround times, 
crane handling movements, and the increasing numbers of vessels calling at the port. The 
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expected operation of the second container terminal, Kelang Port Management (KPM), from 
mid-1993 has provided some competition to KCT (Mazida, 1992). KPM is expected to offer 
a wider range of services, including container handling. This should be beneficial to 
consumers, as competition should enhance efficiency, though actual welfare gains are 
difficult to predict without further information about the nature of the expected duopoly. 
While consumers’ welfare has been enhanced in the case of KCT, this is not necessarily true 
in all cases of divestiture.  
 
Malaysia Airlines (MAS) 
In the early 1980s, Malaysia Airlines (MAS) suffered losses due to high interest rates and 
fuel costs. The government’s own financial difficulties and other priorities also limited the 
funds available to MAS for expansion. An attractive solution to the problem was partial 
divestiture, regarded by some as a form of privatization. In the case of MAS, therefore, 
privatization only involved partial divestiture as majority ownership remained in the hands of 
the government. With its ‘golden share’, ultimate control will continue to remain with the 
government even if it loses majority ownership 
MAS’s post-divestiture experience has been different from KCT’s. Management style has not 
changed significantly as virtually the same people are still in charge. There is no evidence of 
any change in managerial autonomy, as the government seems to be still very much in 
control. However, investment increased to meet anticipated future demand. This resulted in 
an apparent decline in productivity due to the greater rise in capital relative to output, and 
also to the increase in non-fuel intermediate input costs (mainly advertising and marketing 
expenditure). 
MAS has been operating in two different market conditions. The airline faces an oligopolistic 
market internationally while enjoying a domestic monopoly. Hence, prices (fares) have been 
largely exogenously determined internationally, while domestic fares are subject to 
government regulation. Domestically, fares have been adjusted within a designated band to 
maintain profitability. If deregulation accompanies divestiture, such an arrangement could 
easily be abused to the disadvantage of domestic consumers. Of course, increased 
competition on domestic routes can be generated by allowing foreign carrier or even other 
domestic carriers to compete, but this has not been allowed. For example, Singapore 
International Airlines (SIA) wanted to fly between Singapore and Sarawak. However, MAS 
retained its virtual monopoly, invoking its claim to cross- subsidization of commercially 
unprofitable routes. 
According to Jones and Fadil, domestic consumers have been net losers, as they have had to 
pay higher prices and have received only a small fraction of the benefits of the increased 
investments. Instead, the bulk (four-fifths) of the welfare gains have accrued to foreign 
shareholders, competitors, and consumers, with consumers benefiting most due to lower 
airfares in the international market. 
 
Postal Services 
The corporatization of the Postal Services Department (PSD) took place on 1 January 1992 
with promises to provide better quality and more efficient services. As with other privatized 
utilities and natural monopolies, it is important to ask if there is a need to privatize to achieve 
such improvements. The PSD has been financially stable with an impressive track record in 
recent years, showing increasing profits yearly without any increases in postage rates in 
almost 10 years. In 1988, its revenue was RM186.3 million and profits were RM11.3 million. 
In 1989, revenue was RM202.3 million and profits were RM15.9 million. In 1990, revenue 
increased to RM252 million with profits more than doubling to RM44 million (Business 
Times, 31 December 1991). With such impressive earnings, it cannot be argued that the 
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privatization of the PSD is to reduce the financial burden of the government. Furthermore, 
government departments and agencies had been enjoying free postal services all along. With 
corporatization, however, the government had to begin paying between RM5 million and 
RM20 million a year to Pos Malaysia Berhad (PMB) (Kartini, 1991). 
 
Table 12. Comparison of Malaysia’s Domestic Postage Rates with those of  
 Singapore, Thailand, Indonesia, Japan, and India as at 1 May 1991 (RM) 
 
Weight/Country Malaysia  Singapore  Indonesia Thailand  India 
 Japan 
 
Up to 20 gm 0.20 0.30 0.31  0.22  0.14 1.24  
21 - 50 gm 0.30 0.45 0.61  n.a.1 0.41 1.44  
51 - 100 gm 0.45 0.75 0.76 0.352 0.47 3.50  
 
Notes: 1 Not available as rate is based on a combined system, part of a marketing strategy. 
 2 Surface service only, does not involve air service. 
Sources: Goh and Jomo 1995: Table 7.4.  
 
As Table 12 shows, Malaysia’s domestic postage rate for a letter of up to 20 gm was only 20 
sen, the lowest in the region after India. Also, Malaysian postal services have long been 
among the best in developing countries, featuring its low charges and relative efficiency. 
With the core of postal services constituting a natural monopoly, there is not much room for 
enhancing competition. Hence, it is unclear how privatization per se is expected to contribute 
to achieving productive efficiency.  
The Postal Services Department has been a monopoly, and with privatization, it is likely to 
become a private monopoly. Corporatization of the PSD has already involved hefty increases 
in consumer charges. It may also involve increased labor costs in the form of bonuses and 
increased salaries for staff, as well as increased expenditure for overheads for assessment 
rates and quit rent. 
Table 13 compares postage rates before and after corporatization, showing postage rates 
rising tremendously in 1992 with corporatization. For letters (weighing less than 20gm) 
posted to destinations within Malaysia, the postage rate increased by 50 percent; for those 
posted to Singapore and Brunei, the postage rate increased by 100 percent. A detailed 
comparison of the tables will show that some of the postage rates increased by more than 100 
percent in 1992. 
The Postal Services Department has been a monopoly, and with privatization, it is likely to 
become a private monopoly. Corporatization of the PSD has already involved hefty increases 
in consumer charges. It may also involve increased salaries for staff, as well as increased 
expenditure for overheads, for assessment rates and quit rent. 
 
Telephone Services  
The corporatization of the Telecommunications Department (Jabatan Telekom Malaysia) has 
seen the introduction of some better services such as improved counter-services; the option of 
a detailed billing system reducing errors (for which one has to pay more), and quicker 
responses to applications for telephone installations. There is no doubt that there has been 
some efficiency increase and better services, but not without higher charges. Since 
corporatization of the telecommunication services in 1987, even basic telephone charges have 
increased. For example, a three-minute call unit used to be charged 10 sen, but such a call has 
been charged 13 sen since corporatization, i.e. a 30 percent increase. 
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 It is highly unlikely that these improvements in services could not have been achieved 
at much lower cost than the additional consumer charges. Hence, it can hardly be argued that 
the consumers are better off on the whole since the improvements cost much less than the 
extra they have to pay. This does not mean that Telekom Malaysia is less efficient than its 
predecessor, but rather that it is capturing an enhanced rent from the private monopolistic 
position it enjoys. 
 
Passenger Railway Services  
The corporatization of Keretapi Tanah Melayu (KTM) on 1 August 1992 has been seen as a 
step to ease its financial burdens. Compared to other corporatized or privatized monopolies 
(e.g. Tenaga Nasional Bhd and Pos Malaysia), KTM Bhd faces more competition from road 
(as well as sea and air) transport. 
KTM Bhd has to show a track record of profitability before it can be publicly listed on the 
Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange (KLSE). One obvious option available to KTM to cut its 
losses is to increase its fares (Philip, 1992). On 1 January 1993, five months after 
corporatization, KTM increased fares for the second time in three months, as shown in Table 
14. While railway services are said to have improved after corporatization, as in many of the 
other cases reviewed earlier, these generally marginal improvements cannot be said to justify 
the fare increases, implying a definite decline in consumer welfare 
 
Table 14. Railway Passenger Fare Increases  
 
 From 1/8/84 Effective  Effective Increase 
 (sen/km) 1/10/92 Increase 1/1/93 (compared to 
   (sen/km)    (sen/km)  fare of 1/8/84) 
 
First-class coach 12.14 13.96 15% 15.00  24%  
Second-class coach 5.47 5.74 5% 6.50  19%  
Third-class coach 3.36 3.53 5% 3.65 7% 
Supplementary charge RM3 RM4 33% RM4 33% 
 for air-conditioned coacha 
Berth charge for RM15 RM25 67% RM25 67% 
 first-class coacha 
 
Note:  a This is a standard charge irrespective of distance. 
Source: Goh and Jomo 1995: Table 7.6. 
 
Highways 
Until the mid-1980s, the construction and maintenance of public roads in Malaysia were the 
sole responsibility of the public sector. As part of the government’s privatization thrust, the 
construction and operation of toll roads by the private sector were introduced in the mid-
1980s. In existing and proposed road privatization projects, the method for private sector 
involvement is the build-operate-transfer (B-O-T) approach. Under this system, the private 
company finances the construction – in some cases merely involving the widening or 
improvement – and operation of public roads for a specific period, and collects tolls over the 
concession period. The concession period varies from the 9 years for the Jalan Kuching/Jalan 
Kepong Interchange and Jalan Kuching Upgrade projects to 30 years in the case of the North-
South Highway. The concession period varies with the time the concessionaire ostensibly 
needs to recoup the investment. In some B-O-T projects, the toll charges are fixed for the 
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duration of the concession.. In the case of the North-South Highway, there is explicit 
provision for a toll revision after 1996 (see Naidu 1995). 
On 1 January 1993, effective toll charges were increased by 50 percent for the North-South 
Highway, from 5 sen to 7.5 sen per kilometer. For example, the original toll charge from the 
Sungei Besi tollgate to the Tangkak tollgate was RM7.10, while the new toll charge is 
RM10.60. With the increased toll charges, consumers will be adversely affected through 
higher prices charged for transportation, goods and other services, with a negative impact on 
real incomes and welfare.  
 
Hospital Support Services 
As Table 15 shows, Ministry of Health expenditure for hospital support services for the year 
1996 (prior to privatization) was RM143.0 million. Compared to 1996, there was a 228 
percent increase in this expenditure in 1997 (to RM486.9 million), 240 percent in 1998 (to 
RM468.5 million) and 255 percent in 1999 (to RM507.9 million). After the big increase in 
1997 with privatization, the subsequent annual increases were much more modest, i.e. by 3.9 
percent in 1998 from the previous year, and subsequently, a 4.3 percent increase in 1999 over 
1998.  
 
Table 15. Ministry of Health Expenditure on Hospital Support Services, 1996-1999 




Increase over  
preceding year 
1996  143.0 - - 
1997 468.5 228 228 
1998 486.9 240 3.9 
1999 507.9 255 4.3 
Source: Noorul Ainur 2001: 300 - Table 6.2. Computed from unpublished data provided by 
the Finance Division, Ministry of Health. 
 
Despite Bumiputera ownership and control of most, though not all privatized enterprises, it 
seems likely that privatized entities have contracted more to non-Bumiputeras. It has been 
widely acknowledged that greater official commitment to Bumiputera economic 
advancement has raised the ‘Bumiputera premium’ rates. Greater profit maximization by 
privatized entities has probably resulted in less contract awards to more expensive 
Bumiputeras. Although the number of contracts to Bumiputeras remains high, the value of 
contracts to non-Bumiputeras – especially foreigners – is probably much higher (AMMB et 
al. 1995: Table 2.17). 
 
Under-pricing of SOE Initial Public Offer (IPO) Share Issues 
One of the declared aims of privatization is to reduce the financial burden of the government. 
The sale of government-owned enterprises is therefore meant to raise revenue for the 
government. Such one-off proceeds may relieve the government’s financial burden in the 
short run, but may result in forgone income in the long run. Table 16 sums up the proceeds to 
the government derived from the sale of equity of some government-owned enterprises.  
 
Table 16. Proceeds from the Sale of Equity  
 
Company  RM million  
 
Sports Toto Sdn Bhd  113  
Malaysian Airlines System Berhad 469  
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Malaysian International Shipping Corporation 90  
Edaran Otomobil Nasional 29  
Malaysian Shipyard and Engineering 247  
Syarikat Gula Padang Terap 51  
Perusahaan Otomobil Nasional (PROTON) 177  
Tenaga Nasional Berhad (TNB) 248  




Source: Goh and Jomo 1995: Table 7.7. 
 
In all cases of public flotation of government-owned enterprises, there has been substantial 
under-pricing of shares in the initial public offerings. Table 17 reveals that high initial 
premiums were obtained on the first day of secondary trading. As a consequence, the 
government has foregone considerable revenue, amounting to nearly RM4.8 billion for the 14 
companies. 
In the case of Sports Toto, the first 70 percent was sold for RM28 million to Vincent Tan’s B 
& B Enterprise, said to be 60 percent Bumiputera-owned, of which 10 percent was 
subsequently sold to Tunku Abdullah’s Melewar Corporation. The remaining 30 percent was 
later sold for RM85 million to the Daim-connected Raleigh Berhad (26 percent owned by 
Bumiputeras). While the second sale involved a share price seven times that of the first, when 
Sports Toto was listed on the KLSE, it traded at a much higher price on the first day (see 
Table 17), implying under-pricing even in the second instance, and hence, gross under-
pricing in the initial sale. Since Berjaya Corporation (B & B’s holding company) had almost 
56 percent of Sports Toto at the end of the 1990-1991 financial year, and was about 42 
percent Bumiputera-owned, Jones and Fadil (1992c) conclude that private Bumiputera 
interests had relinquished control by selling out, while presumably realizing very 
considerable capital gains to non-Bumiputera interests. 
Such under-pricing of initial public offerings seems to have been deliberately done to 
improve the likelihood of the share offer’s success since failure could have adverse 
consequences. Another reason advanced for such “under-valuation” of assets is to promote 
wider share ownership in line with the government’s redistribution objectives. Unfortunately, 
this politically popular objective of wider share ownership may not be sustained as there is 
widespread ‘stagging’ (selling a share almost immediately for profit) (Toh, 1989). This can 
be seen in Table 17, which shows that turnover has been relatively high for MISC, Sports 
Toto, and KCT.  
However, some writers have argued that there has been no under-pricing of the public 
offerings, which are, according to them, only initially and temporarily, priced higher than 
their intrinsic value by the market due to speculative demand. As evidence, they cite the 
considerable variation in the degree of under-pricing with different share issues. For example, 
the listing of Syarikat Telekom Malaysia Berhad occurred during the Gulf Crisis, resulting in 
a relative modest premium of only 22 percent on the first day of trading. In contrast, the 
initial premium for TNB, listed in May 1992, was 94 percent! 
When Hicom Holdings Berhad (HHB) was formed from Hicom Berhad’s reverse takeover of 
New Serendah Rubber Company Berhad in December 1993, when the stock market was very 
bullish, the stock traded at RM12. Just before the public share issue in March 1994, the stock 
traded at around RM8.50. Based on its own 1994/5 forecast earnings per share of 18 to 20 
sen, HHB was trading at a huge price earnings (P/E) ratio of about 63 (Malaysian Business, 
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16 February 1994). The Capital Issues Committee (CIC) apparently sets share issue prices 
rather conservatively, based on a P/E ratio of between 3.5 and 8.0.  
Interestingly, Bumiputera interests have divested RM1,794.7 million worth of shares in 
publicly listed companies up to 1993, of which 53 percent were shares of companies listed 
during 1990-1992. Consequently, there have been significant dilutions of Bumiputera 
interests in privatized enterprises (see AMMB et al. 1995: Table 2.16). At the average market 
prices quoted for the earlier part of 1993, these shares were valued at RM14,147.8 million, of 
which 68 percent were accounted for by the companies recently listed in 1990-1992. This 
clearly reinforces the impression of general under-pricing of recent share issues, much of 
which is accounted for by privatizations, suggesting private capture of rents due to the under-
pricing of public assets. The difference between the market price and the par value of the 
shares divested by Bumiputeras was RM12,353.1 million, i.e. 688 percent of the par value of 
the shares, which provides some indication of the enormity of the rent capture associated with 
under-pricing (Malaysia, 1993: 69). 
As Table 18 shows, the actual Bumiputera allocations in share issues associated with 
privatizations have increasingly been in excess of the much-mentioned and often-presumed 
30 percent. More ominously, a great proportion of this is allocated by the government 
through procedures which are not transparent, and which are popularly presumed to favor 
those well connected with the dominant faction of the ruling party, or even the Minister of 
Finance himself. Whereas some such allocations were done by the Ministry of Trade and 
Industry in the 1980s, this prerogative was increasingly exercised by the Ministry of Finance 
in the 1990s. In this period, there have also been corresponding increases in both actual 
Bumiputera share allocations as well as those selected by the government, including non-
Bumiputera interests, suggesting the increasing politicization of such share allocations, and 
therefore greater politically-determined privatization-related rent capture.  
Since these types of allocations greatly overlap, it suggests that political influence and access 
are very important determinants of such rent capture among politically influential 
Bumiputeras. However, in so far as they do not coincide, it suggests that there are important 
non-Bumiputera beneficiaries from such government allocations. The magnitude of these 
allocations suggests that the 1993 furor over the diversion of 90 percent of ten million 
Telekom Malaysia shares allocated to Maika Holdings – controlled by the Malaysian Indian 
Congress (MIC), a non-Bumiputera component member of the ruling coalition – to 
companies personally selected and believed to be controlled by the MIC President, only 
reflects the tip of the iceberg of such possible ‘abuses’ involving personal aggrandizement 
ostensibly on behalf of party political interests. Almost incredibly, the very fact of such 
political allocations coupled with under-pricing in themselves have not been the subject of 
investigative scrutiny (see Sunday Times (London), 13 March 1994). 
The likelihood of such abuses is exacerbated by the lack of transparency in these allocations. 
A glance at the share ownership profile of some recently privatized companies shows that 
large, politically favored, predominantly Bumiputera, institutional investors and nominee 
companies have emerged as the major shareholders. According to Telekom Malaysia’s 1991 
Annual Report, for example, as of March 1992, the Ministry of Finance Incorporated (MoF 
Inc.) still held 78.1 percent of the company’s paid-up capital, followed by Permodalan 
Nasional Berhad (PNB) with 4.6 percent, Hongkong and Shanghai Bank (HSB) Nominees 
with 2.8 percent, Citibank Nominees N.A. with 2.5 percent, Cartaban Nominees with 1.8 
percent and Chase Manhattan (Malaysia) Nominees with 1.1 percent. According to TNB’s 
1992 Annual Report, as of October 1992, MoF Inc still held 73.2 percent of its paid-up 






There is no theoretical or analytical consensus on the relationship between privatization 
and distribution, whether in Malaysia or globally. While distribution data have been 
collected by the national authorities, much of the data is jealously guarded by them, 
with findings only selectively published or announced. Since the 1970s, the major policy 
pre-occupation has been with inter-ethnic distribution, especially progress towards 
reducing inter-ethnic economic disparities between Malays and Chinese. Public 
discourse and research effort has tended to reflect this preoccupation. This section will 
review some of the most relevant distribution trends since the 1970s, to draw attention 
to developments since privatization began in the 1980s. 
The NEP’s Outline Perspective Plan, 1971-1990 (OPP1) forecast that the official poverty 
level would be reduced from 49 percent in Peninsular Malaysia in 1969 to 16 percent in 
1990. According to official government plan documents, the poverty rate was reduced to 18 
percent by 1984 and 17 percent by 1987, progress with poverty reduction was brisk through 
the 1970s until the early 1980s, but seems to have been considerably slower since then. Table 
19 summarizes official data on the incidence of poverty in Peninsular Malaysia since 1970. 
Poverty incidence declined from 49.3 percent (official estimate) or 56.7 percent (Anand 
1983) in 1970 to 39.6 percent in 1976, 18.4 percent in 1984 and 17.3 percent in 1987 in 
Peninsular Malaysia alone. In absolute terms, the number of poor households in the peninsula 
dropped from 791,800 in 1970 to 764,400 in 1976 and further to 483,300 in 1984, before 
rising slightly to 485,800 in 1987 after the 1985-6 recession. Poverty incidence for all of 
Malaysia, i.e. including Sabah and Sarawak, fell to 6.1 percent in 1997, before rising after the 
1997-8 regional financial crisis to 7.5 percent in 1999.  
 
Table 19. Malaysia: Incidence of Poverty, 1970-1999 























Sources: Malaysia plan documents. 
 
Official statistics suggest very impressive reductions of poverty in the 1970s and early 1980s, 
especially in Peninsular Malaysia. Although there are many legitimate reservations about the 
quality and nature of this data, there are few observers who would doubt that poverty, as 
officially defined in absolute terms, has been significantly reduced, even though part of the 
decline in poverty may have been due to some changes in the measurement of poverty. In 
view of the generally rapid growth of the Malaysian economy in most of the 1970s and part 
of the 1980s, poverty – as defined by the government – could have been further reduced, if 
more just and effective redistributive policies had been implemented, government waste 
minimized, and government allocations ostensibly for poverty eradication were used 
effectively for reducing poverty, instead of enriching politicians, their ‘clients’ and 
contractors securing rural development projects. More significantly, per capita income levels 
have generally risen with the rapid growth and structural change since the seventies.  
Since poverty is officially conceived in absolute, rather than in relative terms in relation to a 
poverty line income, income inequality can grow as the poverty rate declines if economic 
growth is sufficiently high. Income distribution trends do provide important indications of the 
welfare implications of economic growth and recession, especially as they affect inter-ethnic, 
spatial and other income inequalities. However, it should be remembered that under the NEP, 
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there has been no official commitment to reducing income inequality, but instead an 
emphasis on reducing economic disparities between ethnic groups, particularly between the 
Bumiputeras and non-Bumiputeras.  
Table 20 shows monthly household income trends by ethnicity and location in Malaysia, 
especially Peninsular Malaysia, since the 1970s. These trends suggest that rising incomes and 
poverty reduction in the 1970s may have been accompanied by growing income inequality, 
but there is other evidence to suggest that income inequality declined during the seventies and 
eighties, and has not changed much since then. Average inter-ethnic income disparities also 
declined during the NEP period, but appear to have risen in the 1990s. 
 
Table 20. Peninsular Malaysia: Mean Monthly Household Incomes by 
Ethnic Group and Stratum, 1970-1999  




































































































































Note: Figures for 1970-87 in constant 1978 prices; figures for 1990-99 are constant 1990 
prices. 
Sources: Fourth Malaysia Plan, 1981-85, Mid-Term Review of the Fifth Malaysia Plan, 
1986-90, Seventh Malaysia Plan, 1996-2000, Eighth Malaysia Plan, 2001-2005. 
 
Table 21 shows income distribution trends for the whole country as well as by location in 
Malaysia, especially Peninsular Malaysia, since the 1970s. The table suggests that income 
inequality declined during the seventies and eighties, and has increased slightly since then.  
Despite the popular rhetorical commitment by politicians to poverty eradication, the 1970s 
and early 1980s saw growing emphasis on the NEP’s other pronounced objective to 
‘restructure society’ to abolish the identification of ethnicity with economic function, 
especially to create, expand and consolidate the Malay capitalist and middle classes. As 
officially interpreted, ‘restructuring’ is not meant to abolish or change socio-economic 
relations between classes or economic interest groups; in practice, it mainly seeks to increase 
Bumiputera capital ownership and personnel shares in the more attractive – mainly 
professional – occupations.  
In practice, restructuring efforts have been largely aimed at increasing the share of 
Bumiputera capital as well as the number of Bumiputera businessmen and professionals in 
the context of continued open capitalist development by using the public sector and state 
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intervention extensively. The NEP’s restructuring prong mainly involves redistribution of 
corporate stock ownership, employment and education, with the latter two sometimes 
considered together. There is particular interest in ownership of the modern corporate sector, 
though only a small minority of the population is actually involved, reflecting the dominance 
of capitalist interests in defining supposedly ethnic or communal interests. 
 
Table 21. Malaysia: Income Shares by Income Group, 1970-1999 
































































































































































Note: The published figures for urban and rural Malaysia in 1990 and 1999 do not add up to  
100.0 percent, but only the 1990 calculations are omitted because of the much greater 
disparities involved. 
Sources: Malaysia plan documents. 
 
Thus, wealth restructuring – particularly the 30 percent target for Bumiputera share 
ownership by 1990 – remains the main obsession in most discussions about the NEP. Table 
22 reflects the distribution of ownership of the corporate sector by ethnicity and residence for 
1969 and then from 1983 until 1999. The Bumiputera share rose sharply from 1.5 percent in 
1969 and 2.4 percent in 1970 during the 1970s until the mid-1980s. While the original Mid-
Term Review of the Second Malaysia Plan, 1971-1975 (MTR2MP) target (Malaysia 1973: 84, 
Table 4.8) of 9.0 percent Bumiputera ownership by 1975 was surpassed, only 12.5 percent of 
the corporate sector was in Bumiputera hands by 1980 (instead of the projected 16.0 percent) 
and 19.1 percent in 1985 (instead of the 23.0 percent expected). Instead of the 30.0 percent 
targeted for 1990, the Bumiputera share has hovered around twenty percent since 1983 – 18.7 
percent in 1983, 19.1 percent in 1985, 19.4 percent in 1988, 19.3 percent in 1990, 20.6 
percent in 1995 and 19.3 percent in 1999.  
Meanwhile, the share of foreign residents fell from 63.4 percent in 1970 to 42.9 percent in 
1980, 33.6 percent in 1983, 26.0 percent in 1985 and 24.6 percent in 1988, before rising to 
25.4 percent in 1990, 27.7 percent in 1995 and 32.7 percent in 1999. Meanwhile, the ethnic 
Chinese share rose from 22.8 percent in 1969 to 45.5 percent in 19909 (when ethnically 
anonymous ownership of locally controlled companies was largely assigned to Chinese), 
before declining sharply to 40.9 percent in 1995 and 37.9 percent in 1999. Meanwhile, the 
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Indian share rose slightly from 0.9 percent in 1969 to 1.2 percent in 1985 and 1988, and 1.5 
percent in 1995 and 1999. 
The trust agencies ostensibly set up to advance Bumiputera share ownership as well as 
entrepreneurial and managerial capability have been associated with the growth of the public 
sector under the NEP. The Third Malaysia Plan, 1976-1980 (3MP) (Malaysia 1976: 86, 
Table 4.16) projections for the 30 percent Malay share of the corporate sector in 1990 
anticipated 7.4 percent for ‘Malay individuals’ and 22.6 percent for ‘Malay interests’. The 
Fourth Malaysia Plan, 1981-1985 (4MP), however, reduced the share for Bumiputera 
individuals to 5.2 percent (or 17.3 percent of total Bumiputera ownership) and raised the 
share for ‘Bumiputera trust agencies’ to 24.8 percent (or 82.7 percent). However, since then, 
far greater emphasis has been given to Bumiputera individual wealth acquisition, in 
conjunctions with the privatization policy.  
The share of Bumiputera individuals rose significantly from 7.6 percent in 1983 to 14.2 
percent in 1990, 18.6 percent in 1995 and 17.4 percent in 1999. Meanwhile, the Bumiputera 
trust agencies’ share declined from 11.1 percent in 1983 to 5.1 percent in 1990 and 1.7 
percent in 1999. Individuals accounted for 73.4 percent of total Bumiputera ownership in 
1990 and 91.0 percent in 1999. The share for Bumiputera trust agencies correspondingly fell 
to 9.0 percent in 1999 – a very dramatic reversal in a relatively short space of time, with 
important implications for the composition and nature of Malay capital as well as the 
character and role of state intervention and the public sector in Malaysia. Of course, the issue 
of wealth ownership – whether of shares or other wealth – mainly involves the interests of a 
small elite.10  
Government occupational statistics also suggest that inter-ethnic employment disparities have 
been considerably reduced. Nevertheless, Bumiputera employment in the public sector and in 
agriculture greatly exceeds their overall demographic share. According to the World Bank, 
government remuneration is, on average, about 25 percent higher than in the private sector. 
As Table 23 shows, for the vast majority of the population, inter-ethnic employment 
disparities have been greatly reduced. As far as occupational restructuring is concerned, 
Bumiputeras were significantly under-represented (i.e. less than 45 percent) only at the 
‘administrative and managerial’ level (24.1 percent in 1970, 28.4 percent in 1988 and 37.0 
percent in 2000) and in sales-related occupations (26.7 percent in 1970, 36.5 percent in 1988 
and 37.3 percent in 2000). Nevertheless, the Malay proportions in these occupations have 
greatly increased since Independence, and especially under the NEP, though the Chinese 
proportions still significantly exceed their declining population shares. 
Otherwise, occupational disparities have been significantly reduced. Rather, the main sources 
of tension over employment restructuring involve access to business opportunities and the 
more lucrative occupations. This mainly affects and concerns the middle class. Bumiputeras 
are still under-represented in some of the most lucrative professions, such as medicine, 
accountancy and architecture, though much of this is temporary and will decline as the 
population ages. Hence, it is very likely that tertiary education, and especially access to these 
professions, will continue to preoccupy the middle class, who feel they stand to gain or lose 
most in this regard. For obvious reasons then, focus on the lucrative professions is likely to 
remain. 
Tertiary education as well as related employment and promotion opportunities are the main 
concerns and primary sources of inter-ethnic resentment and conflict, especially among the 
middle class, who correctly see these as determining their life chances. Ethnic percentages in 
professional and technical occupations increasingly reflect demographic proportions in the 
Peninsular Malaysian population, though Bumiputera under-representation in the more 
lucrative and prestigious professions has been highlighted by the Malay middle class, 
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politicians and the government in their arguments for continued if not increased affirmative 
action measures.  
Official concern appears to have moved away from school enrolment ratios, where 
Bumiputeras are now actually ‘over-represented’ owing to the generally larger size of 
Bumiputera families as well as the higher enrolment of non-Bumiputera children in private 
institutions. Even interest in enrolment at the tertiary level has declined with the considerable 
Bumiputera advances since the 1970s and the unprecedented, though occasional phenomenon 
of graduate unemployment since the mid-1980s. Instead, the focus is now primarily on the 
lucrative professions, where Bumiputeras are still relatively under-represented despite rapid 
progress, especially since the 1980s. 
As Table 24 shows, the Bumiputera proportion of the eight prized professions rose from 4.9 
percent in 1970 to 29.0 percent in 1990 and 33.1 percent in 1995 and 32.0 percent in 1997, 
before measurement changes reduced the number of professionals by 45.5 percent in 1997 
and the Bumiputera share to 27.3 percent in 1997 and 28.9 percent in 1999. There may also 
be some underestimation of the Bumiputera proportion as far as those in government service 
(e.g. the legal and judicial service) are concerned. Perhaps, more importantly, recent 
Bumiputera advances into the professions mainly involve the younger age cohorts. Hence, the 
Bumiputera proportion will continue to increase as the population ages, even if the current 
proportions remain unchanged. Malay professionals also seem to earn proportionately more, 
suggesting a likely ethnic premium in their professional charges (Merican, 1987). 
As far as tertiary education more generally is concerned, the Bumiputera population in 
government-accredited local universities and university colleges was 67 percent in 1985 
(Malaysia 1986: 490-1), up from 40 percent in 1970 (Malaysia 1973: 193). The ratio was 
supposed to be 60 percent from the early 1980s, as part of a ‘compromise’ resolution of the 
Merdeka University issue from the late 1970s. The controversy over ethnic quotas for public 
university admissions has continued to the present.  
Such ethnic preoccupations previously constrained state approval of private initiatives in 
human resource development and domestic tertiary education development, despite the 
considerable foreign exchange savings that have since accrued. The situation has changed 
significantly since the mid-1980s as businesses have successfully invested in providing 
tertiary educational credentials. Since then, private tertiary level institutions have been 
allowed and several hundred have been established since then, with most offering ‘twinning 
programs’ with universities overseas for handsome premiums. Continued regulation has 
provided lucrative opportunities for rentier marketing of such degrees. Such preoccupations 
as well as the regime’s obsession with controlling campus dissent have stood in the way of 
the urgent need to reform higher education in order to better prepare the Malaysian 
population for rapid cultural and technological changes. 
Since the mid-1990s, several Bumiputera controlled firms – including Petronas, Tenaga and 
Telekom, i.e. the latter two recently privatized – have been given licenses to set up private 
universities, with the senior Chinese partner in the ruling coalition receiving one in mid-2001. 
The vast majority of students in private and overseas tertiary institutions have been non-
Bumiputera. Most of the thousands of Bumiputera students abroad are believed to be 
government-funded, compared to only a small proportion of non-Bumiputeras. 
 
NEP Redistribution 
After the NEP’s inception, the state’s commitment and priorities — as reflected by NEP 
expenditure allocations — increasingly shifted away from poverty eradication towards 
restructuring (Jomo 1990). Only a small percentage of the Bumiputera population benefits 
significantly from restructuring expenditure, compared with the far greater proportion of the 
Malay population who have benefited from expenditure for those considered poor. There is 
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considerable evidence that only a fraction of poverty eradication funds actually benefits the 
poor, considering the huge bureaucracy and other expenses involved. The nature of poverty 
eradication expenditure also provide greater benefits to the non-poor, but there is no evidence 
that liberalization and privatization since the mid-1980s have improved poverty targeting as 
the pattern of public expenditure serves the interests of the ruling coalition in securing 
continued political support. Shifting the emphasis from poverty eradication to restructuring 
society probably tended to increase inequality within the Malay community. 
The Malaysian government has already passed two opportunities (1991, 2001) to break with 
past policies in the interest of greater economic efficiency, more rapid growth and fairer 
distribution. It seems unlikely that the present ruling coalition will have the political will to 
make reforms in this direction if they threaten its political support. Instead, the government 
chose to continue the basic thrusts of the NEP with some changes, bearing Mahathir policy 
priorities, including greater emphasis on growth, industrialization and the emergence of 
Bumiputera Commercial and Industrial Community (BCIC) plus new names. This 
compromise formula sought to insert and assert Mahathir’s priorities without overly 
threatening his UMNO following who are still yet to be weaned off the NEP. This process 
has been continued in 2001 with the announcement of a new National Vision Policy to 
coincide with the Third Outline Perspective Plan period (2001-2010), an obvious reference to 
Mahathir’s Vision 2020, first enunciated in February 1991.   
Whether or not the new government policy represents any significant departure from policy 
in the 1990s is difficult to gauge, but seems unlikely. In view of policy trends under 
Mahathir, which have mainly benefited the private sector, including foreign investors, there is 
little evidence of any significant advances in social policy to enhance the welfare of the 
majority. Unlike the first decade of the NEP in the seventies, when social policy – albeit 
primarily ethnic-oriented – became important, the last two decades have witnessed 
redistribution efforts, including privatization, increasingly captured by politically-connected 
Malay business and middle class interests while private sector promotion has primarily 
benefited politically well-connected rentier or crony interests, not necessarily only from the 
Malay community as more careful examination will reveal.  
With privatization opportunities from the mid-1980s largely decided on a discretionary basis 
by the government leadership, there has been growing resentment and criticism of ‘rent-
seeking’ and ‘cronyism’. Such disbursement of privatization opportunities also strengthened 
the leadership’s means for patronage, in turn encouraging competition for party and 
government political office and upward mobility. The selective nature of the ‘bail-out’ 
processes and procedures following the 1997-8 currency, financial and economic crises have 
strengthened, rather than undermined these tendencies. 
 
‘Cronyism’: From Privatization To Re-nationalization 
As we have seen, during the “hubris of the early [and mid-] 1990's when any grandiose idea 
was thought not only possible but also profitable” (Jayasankaran 2001), privatization 
proceeded rapidly. Well over 400 projects were privatized, ranging from power utilities, 
telecommunications, highways, ports, water, TV stations to rubbish disposal. Privatization 
reduced public sector employment, with over 97,000 employees, or 11.4 percent of the total 
public sector workforce transferred to the private sector by the end of 2000 (Matthias 2000). 
Privatization also increased capitalization of the Malaysian stock market and contributed to 
asset price bubbles, attracting massive inflows of foreign portfolio investments. The collapse 
of the ringgit -- together with other regional currencies -- from July 1997 accelerated the 
collapse of the stock market and property market bubbles, with tremendous adverse 
repercussions for financial institutions and other corporate interests.  
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Ironically, the popular impression that the privatization policy in Malaysia has been abused in 
practice to advantage a few politically well-connected business interests has been reinforced 
by its recent abandonment and virtual reversal in the aftermath of the currency and financial 
crises of 1997-1998. After some policy ambivalence between July 1997 and August 1998, the 
Mahathir administration undertook a series of policy measures which have had the effect of 
disproportionately saving and advantaging politically influential business interests popularly 
identified as ‘cronies’ (Johnson and Mitton 2001). Hence, the Mahathir policy regime in 
response to the crisis, especially the measures introduced in or implemented from early 
September 1998, is viewed as having given priority to ‘bailing out’ such ‘cronies’. 
The fate of Indah Water Konsortium (IWK) has become emblematic of the failure of 
privatization itself and is now ‘widely considered the worst privatized project in the policy's 
17-year history’ (Jayasankaran 2001). In 1993, Vincent Tan’s IWK was awarded a 28-year 
concession to own, operate and maintain more than 2,800 state-owned sewage-treatment 
plants nationwide. In turn, IWK promised to improve sewage-disposal system at a cost of 
over RM6 billion over two decades.  
In an unprecedented civic action, hundreds of thousands of Malaysians signed petitions 
opposing the IWK privatization as their sewage bills ballooned. Consumers and businesses 
complained bitterly about IWK, while the media exposed gross abuses in IWK operations. 
IWK was apparently forced to reduce its tariffs twice, but only half its customers pay their 
fees. Several changes of ownership and management had little impact (Jayasankaran 2001). 
In June 2000, the Malaysian authorities finally paid over RM192 million to take over Prime 
Utilities Bhd, which controls Indah Water Konsortium (IWK), probably inheriting an 
estimated RM0.9-1.4 billion in debt, described as "clearly irrecoverable losses". Customers 
owe IWK another RM145 million, while IWK is supposed to spend over RM3 billion over 
five years to upgrade its treatment plants. Incredibly, although most observers agree that it 
would be almost impossible to make the company viable in the present circumstances, IWK 
may still go back to private hands, reflecting the government’s continuing faith in the policy 
and the continuing influence of interested Malaysian business parties (Jayasankaran 2001). 
When the Malaysian authorities finally nationalized Indah Water Konsortium (IWK) in mid-
2000, the minister in the Prime Minister's Department, Bernard Dompok claimed that IWK 
was a "special case" and that no other privatized entities would be taken over by the 
government.  Indeed, the privatization policy has not been suspended or subject to critical 
review by the government. Hashim Ismail, the Ministry of Finance's parliamentary secretary, 
told Parliament on 7 August 2001 that the country had saved RM123 billion due to the 
policy, and had received another RM24 billion from the sale of equity and assets (Pillai 
2001). According to Hashim, only ‘three or four’ of the 457 privatization projects had failed. 
According to him, without privatization, the impact of the 1997-98 financial crisis on 
Malaysia would have been far worse. 
In late 2000, the government agreed to pay RM1.79 billion for the 29 percent stake in 
Malaysia Airlines System Bhd, owned by Naluri Berhad and controlled by Tajuddin Ramli. 
At RM8 per share, the government paid more than double MAS' market value of RM3.62 per 
share as at 20 December 2000, which was more than fifty percent higher than its share price a 
month before. The bailout eased Tajuddin’s huge personal debts of RM999.4 million and 
Naluri’s debt of RM888 million. Under Tajuddin’s leadership, MAS had accumulated debt of 
about RM9.4 billion by the end of 2000 and had experienced six years of losses by the end of 
2001, with forecasts no better for the near future (Matthias 2000) with the downturn in the 
world aviation industry after September 11, 2001. 
The MAS bail-out was soon followed by the announcement of what would have been the 
biggest bailout of other failed privatizations, i.e. the proposed purchase of the light rail 
transport (LRT) assets of Putra, controlled by Renong, and Star, owned by the Employees 
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Provident Fund (EPF), British construction company Taylor Woodrow and other state-run 
funds, for RM6 billion (US$1.57 billion). Projek Usahasama Transit Ringan Automatik Sdn 
Bhd (Putra) and Sistem Transit Aliran Ringan Sdn Bhd (Star) both operate LRT systems in 
Kuala Lumpur (KL) that have fallen far short of their optimistic passenger and revenue 
projections.  
Then Finance Ministry advisor Mustapa Mohamad blamed the high development and 
upgrading costs of the LRT system and reduced passengers due to the economic downturn for 
the LRT problems (Matthias 2000). The government proposed to sell bonds with maturities 
of five to 15 years, at coupon rates of from 5.8 to 7.2 percent, to raise funds for the purchase. 
However, after the resignation of Finance Minister Daim in mid-2001, the terms of these 
‘nationalizations’ are being reconsidered to ensure that they are less lucrative for the former 
minister’s protégés who controlled the Renong group, which they have since lost control of. 
The third LRT system for KL was to be built by a company controlled by Vincent Tan. It was 
supposed to have built the third RM2.2 billion monorail project in exchange for his group 
securing the right to develop the Linear City project -- touted as the longest building in the 
world, on the banks of the Kuala Lumpur rivers and the space over them. By 1998, the 
government was being asked to take over the monorail project as the Linear City project 
became unattractive in the face of the property price collapse accompanying the financial 
crisis. This LRT has still not been completed despite receiving a special concessionary loan 
of RM300 million in mid-1998, i.e. well into the 1997-8 crisis. 
Thus far, the privatization of public transport has cost the government RM15 billion, buying 
back privatized companies from the private sector with little loss to those politically well-
connected (Pillai 2001). The government has acquired Malaysia Airlines (MAS) and the 
Renong conglomerate, and is likely to take over the two urban light-rail transit (LRT) 
systems for about RM9 billion ringgit (Jayasankaran 2001). The government also paid 
compensation of almost RM1 billion to the original Bakun hydroelectric dam project 
concessionaire when it cancelled the project in 1998 besides giving the concessionaire 
lucrative logging rights to the area. 
 
The Renong Group 
Renong Bhd emerged in the late eighties as the core listed company of the group that took 
over UMNO’s assets after UMNO was declared illegal in a desperate attempt to preserve 
Mahathir’s leadership of the party and the government after a court challenge by supporters 
of his opponent then, Tengku Razaleigh Hamzah.  The group is led by Halim Saad, a protégé 
of UMNO Treasurer, former Finance Minister, Minister with Special Functions and 
Executive Director of the National Economic Action Council (NEAC), Daim Zainuddin.  
After the ruling party UMNO was dissolved by court order in early 1988, UMNO and 
government leaders often claimed that the new UMNO -- established in its place -- was no 
longer involved in business. The Renong group was said to no longer be under the control of 
UMNO, while clearly, the UMNO Supreme Council did not control Renong.  Thus, for all 
intents and purposes, the holdings were the private property of Halim and other major 
shareholders, who were believed to be answering to Daim, who was UMNO Treasurer from 
mid-1984 until mid-2001. The Renong group was probably not accountable to UMNO as an 
organization in any way, and there is no evidence of it contributing to UMNO’s finances, 
although it may well have contributed to the finances of certain UMNO leaders.  
After the recent downfall of the Renong group, many observers now take the view that the 
Renong group’s assets should not have been privatized in the first place.  According to Prime 
Minister Mahathir in the late 1980s, the North-South Highway (NSH) was privatized to UEM 
on very generous terms to help UMNO pay for its then new building (the Putra World Trade 
Centre complex).  The NSH has been the main ‘cash cow’ for the Renong group.  In any 
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case, the UMNO building should have been more than paid for by now, but the Renong group 
continued to grow. There is no reason why the Highway should not have reverted to the 
Malaysian Highway Authority (LLM) or to the government in some other form.  
In the late 1990s, the CDRC’s bailout terms extended the toll concession by five years, albeit 
at slightly lower authorized toll rates, with a view to raising its value to its owner. Renong 
Bhd had submitted a bailout proposal -- prepared by Renong consultants, Credit Suisse First 
Boston (CSFB) merchant bank -- at great cost to the Malaysian government and public. The 
proposed deal implied the following:  
The government would have to forego future tax payments by PLUS of RM4.5 billion, 
although the government had a large budgetary deficit and had cut public spending in 
general, including for health, education and welfare.  
The government would transfer the RM824 million soft loan provided to finance completion 
of the Second Link from PLUS to Linkedua, who were unlikely to ever be able to pay back, 
while the Renong group would get to keep the 27,000 acres it received at a nominal price of 
just over RM1 per square foot to cross-subsidize the Second Link. 
The government would guarantee RM8 billion in zero-coupon [meaning no income between 
the date of purchase and the date of redemption] bonds (likely to be sold to the EPF, etc., i.e. 
public funds under government control) to replace the Renong group’s debts to lenders.  
The government would extend the North-South Highway toll concession to PLUS. 
 
The proposal claimed that the bailout was necessary because the Renong group owed around 
RM20-28 billion, i.e. accounting for more than five per cent of the loans by the Malaysian 
banking system.  Without such a bailout, it was claimed, the Renong group’s debts would put 
the Malaysian banking system under great stress. Even if this argument was true, the key 
question should have been: how and why did Renong rack up such a huge debt in the first 
place. Further, there were other ways of resolving the problem that duly punish -- not 
rewarded -- those responsible for the mess.  The proposed bailout was against a clear 
principle of the NEAC’s 1999 National Economic Recovery Plan, i.e. that culprits would not 
be allowed to get away without penalty; under the proposal, no penalty would be imposed on 
either the top management or the major shareholders of the Renong group.  
Worse still, many benefits of the bailout would have gone to the Renong group’s foreign 
creditors, to whom at least RM3 billion was owed. Furthermore, since many major 
shareholders of Renong and UEM were foreigners (often using nominees), the Renong group 
bailout proposal would benefit them as well. In short, Malaysian public funds would be used 
to allow the owners of Renong, including its foreign shareholders, to walk away with their 
asset value partly restored at public expense, and to pay off their creditors, including 
foreigners. Also, the proposal sought to ‘nationalize’ or ‘socialize’ the Renong group’s debts 
and liabilities, while allowing Renong to retain its profitable privatized assets.  
For example, the Second Link was not expected to be profitable in the short-term, but 
Renong had bid for it. As an inducement, the government gave the group more than 42 square 
miles of what is now valuable land around Gelang Patah.  The CSFB proposal would have a 
proposed Infrastructure Development Corporation take over the Second Link, while the 
Renong group would get to keep the land, some of which it had already resold for more than 
RM10 per square foot, i.e. ten times the price it paid for it! Also dominant in the consortium 
that took over KTM, the peninsula’s railway, Renong also suggested that the proposed IDC 
take over the generally unprofitable railway services while Renong and others would retain 
the lucrative railway land for itself. 
 
The 1 September 1998 introduction of currency and capital controls provided the government 
with an opportunity to use monetary policy in particular and macroeconomic policy more 
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generally to stimulate economic recovery and to clean up the abuses of recent years. But it is 
now clear that this opportunity could also be abused, not only to bail out selected companies, 
but also certain well-connected individuals (Johnson and Mitton 2001).   
The bailout measures are thus seen as complementing the privatization policy to advance or 
protect crony business interests. For critics, the privatization policy was never meant to serve 
the public interest, but was instead meant to enrich a well-connected few at the expense of the 
government and the public. With many of these beneficiaries in trouble due to the crises, they 
are believed to have lobbied senior government leaders for the government -- and the public -
- to bail them out, by lowering interest rates, ensuring less onerous loan conditions, providing 
emergency credit facilities, taking over their debts and liabilities, and providing 
supplementary sources of revenue generation, while protecting the lucrative and profitable 
corporate assets and private wealth of the owners. 
At the time of the announcement of the government takeover of MAS, then Finance Minister 
Daim Zainuddin denied any bailout in favor of Tajuddin and insisted that the MAS value was 
above the market price, and that MAS had good assets and potential. The price paid by the 
government was more than double the market price, which had risen mysteriously during the 
month before the government’s announcement. Then Finance Ministry advisor Mustapa 
Mohamad made similar claims, citing the Asian financial crisis as the reason for the 
government's bailouts (Matthias 2000). 
In mid-2001, UMNO Treasurer and Finance Minister Daim Zainuddin left the cabinet and 
resigned his party position. In the months that followed, some of the more generous bailout 
terms benefiting his protégés have been subjected to review and are likely to be revised to 
favor them less. The huge Renong conglomerate has been restructured with public funds used 
to take over UEM, which had come to control the Renong group after a controversial reverse 
takeover in November 1997. Other ailing enterprises closely associated with the UMNO 
leadership have also been reorganized under new management. 
Far from penalizing the businessmen handed privatized entities on a silver platter, several 
have been ‘rescued’ from for their failures with multi-billion ringgit bailouts at the expense of 
the government and the taxpayers. The bailouts often involve "conversion of private debt to 
public debt." Nationalization via government bailouts seems to have become an accepted 
means of taking over unprofitable privatized companies, as if confirming the widespread 
view that the privatization strategy has been to "privatize profits and socialize losses". 
Ironically, the main check on this trend may well be due to Daim’s resignation, which is 
likely to limit bailouts of business interests associated with him, as those previously 
aggrieved by him are allowed by Prime Minister -- and once again, Finance Minister -- 
Mahathir to shape and influence public policy. 
 
Conclusion 
Public policy from the late colonial period resulting in the emergence, growth and 
privatization of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in Malaysia involved a combination of 
developmental and distributional concerns. However, there is considerable evidence of poor 
conceptualization, development and management of many of the SOEs by the 1980s. 
Ineffective accountability and budget constraints as well as poor incentives to encourage 
improved performance exacerbated the performance of many Malaysian SOEs.  
The complex circumstances for the emergence of SOEs suggest that privatization would be a 
rather blunt policy instrument for addressing the range of problems faced by Malaysian 
SOEs. This conclusion is reinforced by critical appraisal of the official rationale for the 
privatization policy. The following review of Malaysia’s actual experience of policies 
pursued in the name of privatization raises further concerns.  
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The review of the efficiency consequences of privatization suggests that the actual 
achievements may have had more to do with organizational, managerial and incentive 
reforms, which do not require privatization as a precondition. While there have undoubtedly 
been many improvements in the quality of services provided, user costs have generally risen 
disproportionately higher, with obvious adverse implications for consumer welfare and 
distributional implications. The under-pricing of privatized SOE initial public offers (IPOs) 
has undoubtedly enhanced public support from direct beneficiaries, many of whom have been 
politically well-connected, at the state’s and the public’s expense.  
Privatization advocates usually claim that enhanced efficiency will be achieved through the 
interaction of private ownership and competition. In the Malaysian context, however, 
privatization has not been accompanied by significantly increased competition. For example, 
MAS, Pos Malaysia Berhad, Tenaga Nasional Berhad, Telekom Malaysia, and MISC remain 
virtual monopolies.  
In contrast to privatization, which conceptually only involves property rights, the broader 
concept of marketization – sometimes termed ‘commercialization’, or sometimes even more 
ambiguously, ‘economic liberalization’ – is understood not only to entail privatization, but 
also market liberalization, involving greater competition. Privatization is then expected to be 
accompanied by the relaxation or abolition of monopolistic practices, including statutory 
monopoly powers, such as those usually conferred on and enjoyed by public utilities. 
Privatized entities are thus expected to face competitive markets or environments. 
Competition may encourage more efficient behavior among private – as well as public – 
entities or companies, in order to achieve both productive and allocative efficiencies, unless 
increasing returns to scale are attainable.  
In all these cases, the transfer of ownership from public to private hands has not involved 
reduced user costs or significantly enhanced quality of services. Instead, user costs have 
generally risen quite significantly, resulting in net consumer welfare losses. Hence, efficiency 
gains have not been significant, though they have nevertheless been exaggerated by 
proponents of privatization in Malaysia. And in so far as they have occurred, they are 
unlikely to have been the result of privatization per se, but have been mainly due to 
managerial and organizational reforms which do not require privatization. 
There should instead be a comprehensive critical review of the public sector, including the 
statutory bodies and other SOEs, with a view to reform in order to enhance efficiency, cost-
effectiveness as well as dynamic, equitable, balanced, and sustainable national economic 
development. Many SOEs had been set up ostensibly because the private sector was said to 
be unable or unwilling to provide the services or to produce the goods concerned. Such 
claims may still be relevant in some cases, no longer relevant in other cases, and perhaps 
never even true or relevant in yet other cases. And regardless of the validity of the rationale 
for their establishment in the first place, many SOEs have turned out to be problematic, often 
inefficient, frequently even failing to achieve their own original declared objectives or abused 
by those who control them for their own ends, and draining scarce public resources due to 
their ‘soft budget constraints’ and the very inertia of their existence.  
But privatization is certainly not the universal panacea for the myriad problems of the public 
sector it is often touted to be. Privatization may be no more of a solution to the problems of 
SOEs than the SOEs have been a solution to the problems they were set up to overcome. In 
many instances, the problem of public enterprise is not a problem of state ownership per se, 
but rather due to the absence of explicit, feasible or achievable objectives, or even to the 
existence of too many, often contradictory goals. In other cases, the absence of managerial 
and organizational systems (e.g. flexibility, autonomy) and cultures supportive of and 
encouraging fulfillment of these goals and objectives may be the key problem.  Privatization 
may facilitate the achievement of such organizational goals or objectives with the changes it 
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may bring about in train, but this does not necessarily mean that the fact of privatization is 
responsible for the improvements concerned.   
In such cases, managerial and organizational reforms may well achieve the same objectives 
and goals, or even do better, at lower cost, and thus may be the superior option. However, the 
better option cannot be determined a priori, but should instead be the outcome of careful 
study of the roots of an organization’s malaise. Such a critical review – with a view towards 
reform – should consider the variety of modes of privatization, marketization and other 
reform measures as alternative, sometimes complementary options in dealing with the public 
sector as it has evolved in Malaysia. With such an approach, privatization becomes one 
among several options available to the government for dealing with the undoubted malaise of 
the Malaysian public sector. This flexible approach seems superior to the still prevailing 
narrow dogmatic approach, which views privatization as the only – and presumably – best 
solution to the complex variety of problems faced by the Malaysian public sector.  
The existing approach also neglects the persistent problems faced by the rest of the public 
sector not targeted for privatization, which may in fact require more urgent attention.  
Ironically, their problems are probably more serious – which may explain the lack of private-
sector interest in privatizing them – and hence in greater need of remedy. Furthermore, if the 
privatization policy succeeds in selling off the sector’s most profitable enterprises and 
activities, the public sector will be left with uneconomic, unprofitable, and unattractive 
enterprises and activities, thus only confirming prejudices and charges of public-sector 
incompetence and inefficiency, besides worsening the public-sector deficit with the reduction 
of possibilities for cross-subsidization.  
Unfortunately, however, there does not seem to have been any significant progress in 
checking the various problems that have emerged from the privatization process thus far, and 
in avoiding them in future privatizations. The entire privatization process itself seems to be 
beyond accountability, and the lack of transparency hampers the few who might still feel 
inclined to blow the whistle despite the onerous penalties for doing so.  
The significant increases in consumer prices for privatized or soon-to-be privatized utilities, 
services and infrastructure have been reluctantly accepted by consumers without much public 
dissent, except in the case of the Cheras tolls just before the 1990 general election and the 
sewerage privatization to IWK in 1993. The staggered nature of such price increases as well 
as of the privatizations themselves limits the likelihood of coordinated mass protests against 
privatization. It is unlikely, however, that when the cumulative effects of these privatizations 
are finally realized at the public level, their political consequences may undermine the 
mandate to rule of those responsible. The ruling coalition in Malaysia constantly reshaped the 
political system and other rules, institutions and cultures to consolidate its continued 
incumbency and to co-opt and undermine political dissent and opposition. 
Enhanced efficiency is traditionally conceived of as due to the interaction between private 
ownership and the competitive environment. Hence, a privatization exercise that merely 
involves selling a portion – even a majority – of the shares of a SOE to the public, but is not 
accompanied by greater exposure to market forces, may not bring about desired efficiency 
improvements. Conversely, efficiency gains may be achieved through other changes, e.g. 
management reforms, without any changes in ownership. Even improvements in capital 
resource allocation may be achieved by eliminating soft budget constraints, typically 
identified with, but not a necessary characteristic of, public sectors and strengthening 
management accountability, e.g. through greater organizational transparency.  
            In the case of Malaysia, therefore, desired improvements in efficiency and distribution 
may not be achieved through privatization, since there has been little evidence of increased 
competition associated with privatization. Some of the selected enterprises already privatized 
or expected to be privatized, are natural monopolies. Thus, if privatization merely involves 
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transforming a public monopoly into a private monopoly, consumer welfare may well be 
adversely affected.  In such circumstances, even greater enterprise efficiency may not 
necessarily enhance consumer welfare, but only the monopoly profits accruing to the 
privatized enterprise. To evaluate the impact of privatization on the economic performance of 
an enterprise is not easy. In Malaysia, there is some uneven evidence suggesting 
improvements in various aspects of some firm performances following privatization. The 
problem here is that such improved performance may be wrongly attributed to changes in 
ownership per se, without any conclusive evidence of such causation. Efficiency gains, for 
instance, may well be due to other changes coinciding with, but not caused by, the change in 
ownership associated with privatization. 
 This is not to deny some efficiency gains accompanying privatization. However, the 
Malaysian experience suggests that the uneven and modest overall efficiency gains associated 
with privatization have been misleadingly attributed to privatization. Improvements in 
efficiency as well as service quality have been accompanied by disproportionately higher user 
costs, i.e. diminishing consumer welfare. This can be largely attributed to the retained 
monopoly status and poor regulation of privatized entities.  
The review of recent distributional trends in income and wealth distribution, poverty 
reduction as well as NEP redistribution policy efforts suggests growing inequalities since the 
late eighties. However, such broad distributional trends cannot be attributed to privatization 
alone as many other contemporary factors and developments would also have had 
distributional consequences. Seen from a rent-seeking perspective, it is not surprising that 
many of those who had previously advocated and benefited from privatization, urged the 
government to nationalize their debt and liabilities in the aftermath of the 1997-98 financial 
crisis.  
It might be argued that privatization has been an important means to enhance Bumiputera 
stock ownership, but there has been little increase of the overall Bumiputera share of 
corporate wealth since the mid-eighties, i.e. the period since the privatization policy was first 
implemented. Instead, there is now considerable evidence that privatization was an important 
means for enhancing the private wealth of the politically influential and well connected, and 
not just among the Bumiputera elite. It is not clear whether this was either necessary or 
desirable for improving inter-ethnic relations. After all, one could just as well argue such 
blatant aggrandizement by a few cronies resulted in the country’s political crisis since mid-
1998. 
There is also little evidence that privatization has significantly enhanced growth. In fact, a 
case can be made that financial resources -- which may have gone into new productive 
capacities -- were diverted to buy over assets from the government at discounted prices, i.e. at 
the expense of the state and the public. Hence, there are few, if any, progressive distributional 
outcomes attributable to privatization per se.  
This does not mean that it could not have been worse, as suggested by some commentaries 
about some Latin American or Eastern European experiences. However, there is little 
evidence that the government’s retention of golden shares, limited privatization of minority 
portions to nationals and other checks on private power have been crucial to limiting possible 
abuse. Arguably, some checks and balances emerged due to some whistle-blowing – despite 
considerable threats and intimidation -- by some opposition parties, non-governmental 





                                                                                                                                                        
1      Help and critical feedback from Dr Noorul Ainur and others are gratefully acknowledged with the usual 
caveat that they should not be held responsible for the contents of this paper. 
2  However, it should also be pointed out that various criticisms have been made about official share 
distribution data. Besides the valuation problem raised by using nominal or par values which, it is 
claimed, especially underestimates the market value of Bumiputera corporate wealth, and 
underestimation owing to the use of nominee companies, the Malaysian government has not 
explained how share capital owned directly by the government and other bodies – such as Bank 
Negara Malaysia (the central bank) or the Employees Provident Fund – is categorized.   
3  The holding agencies are organized under various Federal Ministries, the principal ones being the 
Ministry of Public Enterprises, the Prime Minister's Office, the Ministry of Primary Industries, 
and the Ministry of Regional Development. In addition, the Minister of Finance (Incorporated) 
holds equity directly in a small number of enterprises – in particular, those that have been 
partially privatized. 
4  Although these fifty account for a major share of the sector by most economic criteria.  
5  A value of 100 percent represents equal amounts of debt and equity capital in total long-term 
liabilities.  
6  Which, as noted, captures financial data on only approximately 50 of the SOEs.  
7  CICU data extend back to 1980, but cover only about 40 percent of the full SOE sample. Average 
enterprise performance indicators are applied to the full SOE sector (assumed to be 1,000 
enterprises).  
8  Where accumulated losses exceed paid-up capital.  
9  This happened despite some official discouragement of Chinese investments and capital flight 
attributable to the Industrial Coordination Act, higher interest rates abroad as well as emigration 
and investments overseas (‘exit’) due to Chinese frustrations in Malaysia. The resilience of 
Chinese capital should not be underestimated, however.  
  The decline in ethnic Chinese political influence after the 1960s has resulted in various 
responses and initiatives, varying with the specific interests concerned. From 1985, some of the 
more politically inspired initiatives were exposed as business scams dependent on political 
patronage or protection, exploited by politicians and businessmen for their own selfish ends. 
These exposures have further undermined the already seriously eroded position of the Malaysian 
Chinese Association (MCA), the second most important party in the ruling coalition. Despite its 
sizeable share of the economy, Chinese capital has limited control over the financial (banking, 
etc.) sector and the ‘commanding heights’ of the traditional capitalist sectors (international trade, 
primary production), which have mainly been taken over from foreign (especially British) capital 
by the state, ostensibly for the Malays.  
10  The high concentration of share capital ownership within each ethnic community was almost 
definitely understated in the case of the ASN during the 1980s, and the ASB since then. Although 
well over two million Bumiputeras were involved by the late 1980s, the vast majority had 
invested RM500 or less, while about 1.3 percent of all eligible Bumiputeras owned 75 percent of 
all ASN shares! 
 
